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HEARING ON SOVIET STRATEGY AND ITS

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

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and clinics as well as the hunting down of private organizations seeking to provide some small measure of medical care inside Afghanistan.

Today's hearing will focus on Soviet strategy. Many believe the Soviets have failed in Afghanistan and have become bogged down. In my view, that is a misperception. In my view, the Soviets have a long-term, low-cost strategy that is working quite well; namely, hold onto the important installations and mercilessly destroy the means of resistance by creating terror, hunger and disease.

The Soviet strategy is working. Out of a preinvasion population of 15 million persons, approximately, 1 million out of 15 million, 1 million Afghans have been killed and another 4 million have been driven by fear and misery into foreign exile.

Just for purposes of comparison, if this misery and calamity had been inflicted on the United States, that would mean some 15 million Americans would have been killed and some 59 million Americans, in proportion, would have been driven into exile. The cost to the Soviets, about 8,000 killed.

The Soviets will succeed in their long-term strategy providing three conditions continue to exist. First, the Freedom Fighters are denied weapons which are effective against Soviet aircraft, particularly the MI-24 attack

helicopter. Second, the Freedom Fighters are denied the means to deal with hunger and famine. And third, the free world continues to fail to undertake a massive public diplomacy effort to exert every possible pressure on the Soviets to withdraw, including the pressure of genuine linkage between Soviet conduct and the signing of international agreements.

So far the free world, including the United States, in my view, has unwittingly cooperated in meeting the conditions for Soviet success in Afghanistan. We hope these hearings will bring about a change in that sad and disgraceful situation.

Congressman Ritter.

Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to participate in this third in a series of hearings on the situation in Afghanistan.

In the first series, we heard about Soviet policy to deny food to the Afghan people, particularly in some of the more insulated areas. We heard about the signals of impending famine.

In the second series of hearings, we heard about the terrible medical assistance to people who are not only wounded in battle, wounded in indiscriminate bombings by the Soviets, but also people who are, because of the conditions in the country, because of the lack of food, exposed to

diseases that once were preventable.

Indeed, this policy is scorched earth and beyond. Indeed, this policy is to deny the Afghanistan people their nation and to essentially remove the Afghanistan people from Afghanistan. This policy, if you carry it out, next year, the year after, five years, ten years, has got to remove the Afghan people from Afghanistan, either through death, through weakness, through sickness, or through another kind of genocide -- migratory genocide.

It is awfully important that the American people understand what is happening in Afghanistan. All of the major human rights organizations in the world have taken up the subject of Afghanistan. The recent UN Commission on Human Rights has made an excellent report, in addition to our Helsinki Report, in addition to the Helsinki Watch Group, in addition to Amnesty.

The world knows what is going on in Afghanistan. When one asks the question what is the Soviet aim in Afghanistan, it has got to come out Afghanistan without the Afghan people.

If you look at the high ground above South Asia, if you look at the short distance between Afghan airfields and the Arabian Sea, if you look at the deep water port of Gwadar, sitting to the south of the Baluchistan province, you see a dream, not only of commissars but of czars, a millenial dream of dominance of South Asia, for sitting astride the shipping

lanes of the west for not only oil but other valuable strategic materials and materials of trade and commerce.

As the Senator has stated, the course of this war extrapolated out, given the cost to the Soviets presently, is the death of the Afghan nation. We aim to call attention to what is going on so as to bring to the Afghan people a greater ability to resist, be it food, be it medicine, or be it the arms to neutralize some of the high technology capability that is being brought to bear against them.

The Senator mentioned specifically the MI-24 attack helicopters. These are the latest armored battle machines that go into action against villages and innocent civilians.

If we do not act now, we will have missed a crucial moment in the history of western civilization. We will have given to the Soviets one of the great strategic victories in modern times.

I commend the Senator and my colleagues on the Task Force on Afghanistan for bringing attention to this and bringing such a distinguished witness as Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick to appear before us today. Thank you.

Senator Humphrey. Indeed our first witness is Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, we are pleased and proud to have you with us here this morning, and you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEANE KIRKPATRICK,
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Senator Humphrey.

I may say that I am especially pleased to be here this morning to appear before this Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan. I too commend you for having organized these hearings to focus attention on this desperately important human, political and geostrategic problem with which we are all confronted.

I also commend Congressman Ritter for joining you in these hearings.

As you know, we deal regularly with the problem of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan inside the United Nations. Annually the General Assembly considers the continuing occupation of Afghanistan, the human and the international consequences of that occupation, and passes a resolution concerning Afghanistan which not only commands the support of the overwhelming majority of the nations of the General Assembly, of the United Nations that is to say, but also commands larger majorities each year.

In representing the United States in that forum over the last four years, I have had repeated occasion to speak to this question, and I thank you for having invited me today to once again address this question.

I know that other witnesses have covered some of the

same topics which I will touch on today, but I hope you will bear with me. I would like to request that my written statement be incorporated into the record of the Task Force.

Senator Humphrey. Of course.

(The statement follows:)

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I will summarize that statement in my oral testimony.

I should like to begin by asserting that the Soviet occupation, as you know, as we all know, continues, as it has over the past five years, but there are significant differences. Both sides in Afghanistan are stronger. The fighting is more intense. Changes in Soviet force profile and tactics are the result, we believe, of the Red Army and associated Soviet elements taking a greater role in the fighting.

The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan remain ineffective and unreliable and have consistently frustrated Soviet efforts to build up those Afghan forces. The Mujahideen exhibit continued improvements in armaments, coordination, organization, capability. Over the past six months, compared to the winter season in previous years, fighting within Afghanistan and cross-border violations by Soviet and Afghan forces against Pakistan and Iran have also increased. There is a continued effort to intensify the fighting in the border regions, and we expect that that may continue.

Finally, in summary, I may say, the costs to the Soviet Union of continuing the occupation and devastation of Afghanistan are very high, but we believe those costs are bearable.

Moscow's primary thrust has been to seek a military solution to the problem of maintaining a totally pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. The Soviets are aware that they are far from having achieved the military solution which they seek, but they are clearly prepared to conduct a very long struggle to that end. And evidence of that preparation and will proliferates.

They understand that the only reliable military forces in their effort to conquer Afghanistan are Soviet forces. They hope that in the long run it will prove possible to transfer more of the fighting burden to the Afghans.

Some Soviet officials appear to believe that control of the country, aside from the key cities, cannot be gained by Soviet forces as presently committed. But nonetheless, the Soviet government is not apparently at this time prepared to make the substantially larger commitment that would be needed for a more rapid victory. Soviet military activities in Afghanistan for the past several years have consequently represented a search for more effective tactics rather than a campaign for an early victory.

As you are aware, Soviet forces in Afghanistan have increased over the past year by something over 10,000 to some 110,000 to 115,000 Soviet troops. These troops are supported by some 30,000 to 35,000 active duty troops across the border, inside the Soviet Union, under a command based in

Tashkent. These arrangements facilitate the occasional operational use of forces and increased use of Soviet aircraft based in the Soviet Union itself. The bombers which carpet bombed the Panjshir Valley during last year's offensive were staged directly from the Soviet Union.

In addition to the marginal numerical increase, Soviet forces in Afghanistan have been strengthened by the deployment of troops better suited for counter insurgency operations and better equipped for counter insurgency, including improved equipment and firepower and upgraded air support.

Soviet special forces are making their presence felt by unconventional attacks on the Mujahideen. Military police-type units are being utilized for screening traffic on the highways and for urban control duties in Kabul. Hardware improvements have included the arrival of more artillery and rocket launchers, including some not previously used in Afghanistan. The Soviets have been further strengthening and hardening their bases and facilities and improving their logistical network.

We believe these are indications of a readiness and an intention to remain in Afghanistan for some time to come.

There have also been refinements in military tactics to which I have referred and with which you are familiar. The Afghan military, as I have indicated, remains worse than

useless in its own counter insurgency operation. It is still a source of major munitions for the Mujahideen, and desertions from the Afghan armies organized by the Soviet Union continue to be high.

More regime garrisons would have been overrun by the guerrilas if the Afghan military occupying those garrisons were not perceived as nonthreatening sources of supply to the Mujahideen.

Afghan troops desert at every opportunity and still continue frequently or periodically to desert en masse. One Afghan division reportedly lost some 900 men, including officers, at a single stroke.

Problems of replacing the Afghan army and filling its ranks continue. The use of pressganging and of offers that are intended to be very attractive to volunteers are common. An ill-fated scheme to recruit high school students has backfired as over half of the students failed their exams in order to avoid being taken into the Afghan army.

More important, despite concentrated efforts such as training in the Soviet Union, the Soviets have so far been unable to build a large ideologically committed cadre in the Afghan armed forces on whom they could rely and to whom they could eventually hand over the protection of the regime. The majority of leftists in the military belong to the Khalq faction of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, but

even their loyalty is suspect.

Partly to mollify the Khalqi officers, but also probably as a mark of their general dissatisfaction with the performance of the DRS military, the Soviets have removed their Minister of Defense. Abdul Zader, a Parcham leaning pragmatist, was replaced in December of '84 by a man more strongly identified with the Khalq and who had been trained in the Soviet Union and had spent most of the last two years inside the Soviet Union.

Combat has been focused in the Panjshir Valley, as you are aware. Border violations to which I referred have increased. One result of the fighting near the border is a continuing high level of Soviet-Afghan violations of Pakistani territory by reconnaissance flights, bombing attacks and shellings.

The resistance, incredibly enough, has continued to multiply and be reinforced inside Afghanistan. Operational cooperation among the various fighting groups inside Afghanistan also continues to improve, although the parties remain fundamentally divided.

It was interesting to note that the Afghan regime, the Karmal regime, took no note and had no celebration of its fifth anniversary since its installation but, instead, concentrated on the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Democratic Party of Afghanistan, at which celebration

Soviet representatives were, of course, featured.

Inside Afghanistan, as you know, trade and aid are ever more oriented toward the Soviet Union, although a variety of goods from many countries can still be brought into the Kabul Bazaar. Scattered reductions in precipitation, including effects of war, including Soviet regime destruction of crops and agricultural infrastructure, have caused food shortages in some areas, already about which you have been informed and to which I will refer again.

The efforts at reorientation of the Afghan economy toward the Soviet Union and its integration into the Soviet economy have also had negative effects on the indigenous economy.

The Soviet policy in Afghanistan would seem to look toward continued long-range involvement in that region, and of course, it includes a diplomatic aspect. From the outset, the Soviet Union has looked upon diplomatic activities with regard to Afghanistan as an adjunct to its military operations. Diplomacy presently centers on the UN-sponsored proximity meetings in Geneva. The last in August 1984 and the next scheduled for May 1985 were delayed because of the Pakistani elections.

The Soviet position regarding this process has so far not changed. Moscow continues to insist that prior cessation of what they call outside interference in support of the

Mujahideen is a precondition for any Soviet troop withdrawal. And Moscow stands firm on the question of troop withdrawal. That is, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is a bilateral issue which can be discussed only with its Afghan client stated and puppet government. The Kabul regime itself, they insist, is not subject to international discussions.

The Soviet Union has apparently been willing to keep the UN efforts going, in part at least because it enables them to hold at bay international demands for a negotiated settlement, and it provides them an arena in which to maintain that the key to the Afghan problem lies in stanching the flow of assistance to the Mujahideen. It gives them, in other words, an opportunity to redefine the problem as one of assistance to the Mujahideen rather than a problem of continuing Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

From the Soviet viewpoint, the most serious problem continues to be the strength of the Mujahideen. So far, the evidence suggests that the Soviet Union considers the diplomatic consequences of the Afghan war to be acceptable, much as they seem to consider the military consequences of the Afghan war acceptable. It is nonetheless true that the continuation of that occupation has a negative consequence for the Soviet image and its position in such world bodies as the United Nations.

The Afghan war has created some domestic problems with the Soviets as well, but none of those problems appear to be unmanageable. The economic burden of the war on the Soviet Union does not appear to be unacceptable. Direct military expenditures pertaining to Afghanistan probably amount, we estimate, to less than one percent of the Soviet military expenditures. And even this is offset by gains in combat experience, equipment testing, and the like.

Related economic assistance to the Babrak regime has probably not yet reached the level granted to major client states of Cuba and Vietnam. So it is important to keep the Soviet investment in context and in proportion.

There have been occasional reports of efforts by potential Soviet conscripts to avoid service in Afghanistan, but this and related problems caused by the growing number of casualties and returning veterans are also manageable under the Soviet system.

There has been a slow growth in Soviet media coverage of the Afghan war, recently resorting to patriotic literary allusions and even occasionally featuring articles describing the individual heroism of Soviet soldiers in combat. This coverage, too, seems to be preparing the Soviet populace for a long haul in Afghanistan.

To understand what the Soviet war means to the Soviet Union, and why the Soviet presence in Afghanistan is

continued, I believe it is necessary to understand why the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the first place.

The answer to that question, why did the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan, is not easily come by. It is not a simple question. Obviously, they did not invade Afghanistan to eliminate a threat to the security of the Soviet Union. No such threat existed. For decades, the Soviet Union had described its relations with Afghanistan as a very model of peaceful coexistence and as proof of how the Soviet Union could live next to small neighboring countries without interfering in their internal affairs.

Obviously, the Soviet Union did not invade Afghanistan to prevent the threat of Muslim fundamentalism from spreading to the Soviet Union's own Central Asian Muslim provinces. The fact is that traditional Islam of Afghanistan did not threaten either the Soviets or even an Afghan communist regime. As long as the government of Afghanistan was ready to leave traditional patterns of life essentially undisturbed, the Afghan populace seems to have remained indifferent to the specific form of government, including a communist government, which ruled them.

Obviously, the Soviet Union did not invade Afghanistan because of a desire to install there a communist government. In fact, a communist government had already been installed in Afghanistan. When the April 1978 coup eliminated the Daoud

regime, which was nonaligned but independent, that coup of April 1978 brought the Khelqi communist regime to power. That regime, the Khelqi communist regime, could not be faulted for lack of zeal since it had set about trying to transform Afghan society.

It is true that the effort of that regime to transform Afghan society produced opposition and resistance among traditional Afghanistan. That resistance occurred at a time of unprecedented Soviet expansion. When Soviet analysts were convinced that the world correlation of forces had shifted in their favor. And it is, I believe, this conjunction of events, of resistance by the population to efforts at wholesale transformation of their way of life, and the period of unprecedented momentum toward unprecedented Soviet expansion, this conjunction of events, I believe, constituted the explanation for the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan because they intended to effectively essentially incorporate that country. Following the fall of Saigon, the expansion of the Soviet empire and Soviet influence preceded rapidly in Asia, Africa, Central America, elsewhere, creating new satellites and client states in far-flung places such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin, South Yemen, Nicaragua, Grenada, and elsewhere.

This expansion largely proceeded through subversion and proxy forces, however, and not through the direct use of Soviet military force. It is very important to recall that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the first direct use of Soviet military force outside the Soviet bloc since World War II.

For the first time since World War II, the Soviet Union invaded an independent country. That invasion, launched on Christmas Eve of 1979, altered the climate and the course of world politics, severely aggravated the tensions between East and West, and had an important effect on the prospects for continuing stability in South Asia and the Persian Gulf.

It was, in short, a momentous event, and it is a momentous event which we are seeking to explain here. It was not one of a number of comparable initiatives. It was a unique effort to conquer by military force an independent country.

The invasion, as we know, has rent the fabric of Afghanistan society, driving nearly half the population of Afghanistan into either internal or external exile, driving millions of Afghans outside their own country, devastating the Afghan economy, threatening now to produce a famine of major proportions. It has tide down approximately 150,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan and across the border.

Soviet casualties, as we know, have been high. Their

objectives still eludes them. This has, as you, Senator, referred to or suggested, left some observers, especially American observers, speculating that the Soviet Union may be stuck in its own Vietnam, may be bogged down in a quagmire that spreads its resources, bleeds its army, and promises failure.

I believe there are fundamental flaws in the various Vietnam analogies and efforts to understand the Soviet position in Afghanistan by way of the American interpretation of our experience in Vietnam. I should like to suggest, first, that Vietnam was a major political problem for the United States because of the response of American public opinion to continued war.

Vivid information on American casualties was not only available, it was virtually inescapable. Criticism of U.S. Government policy was not only possible, it was ubiquitous. Organized opposition to the U.S. role in Vietnam was widespread and effective. Periodic elections provided an opportunity to express popular dissatisfaction with the American Vietnam policy.

But all these conditions and all these problems depend on democracy and a democratic political culture. They depend on a free press, on the right to assemble, the right to oppose, the right to organize an opposition candidacy, the right to turn an American government out if the majority of

Americans disapprove of its policy.

None of these conditions of democracy prevail in the Soviet Union.

Second, there is a profound difference, and a very important one, in American and Soviet time frames. If the goal of Soviet strategy is, as most observers today believe, the transformation of Afghan society and politics, then the Soviets have already made substantial progress to that end. What Louis Dupree has called migratory genocide and the "rubbleization" of Afghanistan is far advanced. Chemical weapons, carpet bombing, pillage, destruction of irrigation networks, destruction of crops, leveling of villages, have had the effect of expelling, disorganizing, demoralizing, to some extent, the population.

A massive program of separating eight and nine year old children from their parents and sending them to the Soviet Union for education is, of course, preparing a new generation and an evidence of the Soviet time frame, the time frame in which they are considering their problem.

The Soviets have sometimes been clear about their goals and more often about their time frame. "Time changes everything," one Soviet official noted. "In another 10 or 20 years, the new generation of Afghans will view our presence differently."

The short-range time frames in which we Americans think

about foreign policy are profoundly ill-suited, I think, to understanding Soviet goals and policies in Afghanistan. Our assumptions about public opinion and foreign policy are equally misleading. Our own lack of interest in territorial expansion makes it difficult for us to understand Soviet goals and policies.

It seems likely, I would insist, that the Soviet goal in Afghanistan is effective incorporation of Afghanistan and achievement of a warm water port and geopolitical access to Iran and Pakistan. The Soviet claim that it is providing fraternal assistance to Afghanistan with its limited military contingent constitutes a kind of ominous echo of the assurances given by the Soviet Union to two of Afghanistan's neighbors who were once the independent Muslim states of Khiva and Bokara and which are, of course, today part of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets have already taken significant steps in the direction of the military, economic and social integration of Afghanistan into the Soviet sphere. Soviet military officers in significant numbers are learning the Baluchi language.

The Soviets have consolidated their military transport and communications infrastructure, including the expansion of existing airfields and the completion of the bridge across the Amu Darya River. They have tightened their grips on the strategic Wakhan corridor which rests on Pakistan's

northernmost border and links Afghanistan with China. They have tied Afghanistan's economy tightly to those of the Soviet bloc through a proliferation of economic and trade agreements.

Perhaps most significant is the Soviet effort to reshape Afghan culture and replace the decimated intellectual and middle classes with a new elite trained in the Soviet mold. Thousands of Afghanistans, including, as I suggested, children between the ages of six and nine, are being trained in the Soviet Union and other bloc countries while the Afghan education system is being overhauled and restructured along Soviet lines.

The Sovietization of Kabul University is made evident by the presence of Soviet advisors at all levels of administration and instruction and in the preference given to the party activists in admissions. The curriculum of Afghanistan's primary education system has been redrawn to promote indoctrination in Marxist-Leninost ideology and to prepare young Afghans for further study in the Soviet Union.

Afghanistan would not be the only prize of such a development. Babrak Karmal promised in May 1982 that before long the Afghan army itself would be capable of playing a role "not only in Afghanistan but in the region as well."

Some strategists, including Rossane Klass, believe: "There can be no longer any doubt that Soviet moves in

Afghanistan since 1978 have been aimed at creating a strategic base from which to control Iran, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean." "If Pakistan can be collapsed or neutralized and detached from Washington by threats," Klass wrote, "the Soviet Union will effectively dominate the vast area from the Horn of Africa to the Strait of Malacca without having fired a shot."

Ten major Soviet air bases have been built in Afghanistan, and more are in the works. All are aimed beyond Afghanistan.

The fate of Afghanistan is profoundly important to the United States, to the independent nations of Asia, and, indeed, to the independent nations of the world. The fate of Afghanistan is important for humanitarian reasons, for reasons of example, and for geostrategic reasons.

The Afghan people have been gassed, bombed, burned, buried, driven from their homes, and now they are threatened with being starved. "Aid workers with experience in famines," the Economist reported, "say that Afghanistan is sliding towards disaster." Dr. Frances O'Souza asserted that some 500,000 people in Afghanistan are in imminent danger of starvation.

Obviously, there are important valid humanitarian reasons for assisting Afghans inside and outside of Afghanistan.

The resistance of the Afghan nation to incorporation, its struggle to survive, is a challenge to the carefully cultivated Soviet image of invincibility. The truth is that Soviet triumph in Afghanistan is not inevitable, and defeat of the Mujahideen is not inevitable, and the expansion of Soviet power in the region is not inevitable. The death of the Afghan nation is not inevitable. If Soviet time frames are long, so are Afghans' time frames long. And the Afghani's determination to survive, the determination that the Afghan nation shall survive, is a long-range goal. It is a deeply embedded commitment which the Afghan people are in no danger of abandoning.

The final consequences of Soviet goals and Afghan resistance are not known today and they are not even predictable. But it is clear that support for the survival of the Afghan people is a moral, a political, and a geostrategic necessity.

It is also clear that victory or surrender are not the only alternatives facing the Soviet Union today. Nor does anyone desire to confront the Soviet Union with only the alternatives of victory or surrender.

The UN General Assembly's resolution passed last year by the largest margin ever contains four major elements offering the basis for a negotiated settlement that will be just and viable, one in which the legitimate security interests of all

parties could be protected.

The elements are the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops, that is Soviet troops, from Afghanistan; the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, nonaligned character of Afghanistan; the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion and constraint; and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily and in security to their homes.

These conditions were endorsed by President Reagan in his speech before the UN General Assembly last fall and, indeed, have been endorsed by the overwhelming majority of nation member states. We believe that this is a basis for an honorable solution which could serve the interests of all parties.

The United States supports the efforts of the Secretary General and his personal representative, Mr. Diego Cordovez. We support, too, the efforts of the government of Pakistan to seek a solution through this media. We believe that these efforts offer the basis for hope that a negotiated political settlement can be found which will end the terrible war against the Afghan people.

We believe that the people of Afghanistan, of Pakistan,

and of the Soviet Union, would profit greatly from such a peaceable solution. In the meanwhile, we believe that there are no inevitable outcomes in Afghanistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Madam Ambassador, for that comprehensive and excellent statement.

You cited the suffering of the people of Afghanistan at the hands of the Soviet government. You said that they have been gassed, bombed, burned, starved, you used Louis Dupree's term migratory genocide.

Is there any reason to suppose that the demise of Mr. Chernenko will make any difference in this matter, or is the Soviet goal and strategy of such a nature as to continue irrespective of who the new leader may be?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Humphrey, I would like to say, first of all, that since the Soviet Union is a thoroughly closed society, we know very little about the details of the succession process or who a new leader is likely to be.

We do know certain things, however. We know that an effort has been made, particularly in the period since Brezhnev ascended to power, to institutionalize the succession in the Soviet government and to indeed provide collective leadership of a kind that would minimize the effects of an individual on policy.

We also know, however, that in spite of those efforts, individuals do apparently continue to make some difference in the Soviet leadership. It does seem to matter somewhat who achieves power and who fails to achieve power, who is on top and who is in the supporting cast.

It would appear, for example, that the increased political activity in the disinformation field during the Andropov period reflected the prior experience of Premier Andropov. It would appear also that the world context and Soviet judgments about the world correlation of forces make a real difference in their strategy and their tactics.

I have already suggested that we believe that the momentum in the expansion of Soviet influence and control in the world in the period between the fall of Saigon and the invasion of Afghanistan encouraged the decision to invade Afghanistan. It was an unusual decision and an unusually reckless decision.

I think there is some reason to suppose that the character of the leader who emerges as "premos enterparis" in the Soviet Politburo now could affect decisions concerning strategy in Afghanistan, not immediately, because of the institutionalization of decisionmaking and because bureaucracies are slow in fact to change in any country, and certainly as thoroughly bureaucratized a system as the Soviet

system is slow to change and resistant to change. But it is possible. It could make a difference.

That is a reason, Senator Humphrey, that I desire particularly to emphasize this morning, that if there is an honorable way out for the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, their victory and surrender or victory and defeat are not the only alternatives available to them. And we would, of course, profoundly hope that the new leader of the Soviet Union would assess the total cost to the Soviet Union, diplomatic as well as military, human as well as economic, and conclude that it was in the interest of his country as well to seek that honorable way out.

Senator Humphrey. You used a phrase which the Soviets are fond of using themselves, correlation of forces. We know from Soviet literature that the Soviets feel that the correlation of forces has shifted in their favor.

Do I read into your statement the belief that the Soviets have moved in this way, which is unprecedented since World War II, to invade a neighboring country which is not a part of the Eastern Bloc and certainly not a threat to them, do I read into your statement the belief that the Soviets have moved into Afghanistan because they believe in effect they can get away with it and if they succeed in Afghanistan, it is quite certain, given their belief that the correlation of forces has shifted in their favor, that they will continue

beyond perhaps into the region known as Baluchistan?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Humphrey, I believe that that was the assumption in December 1979 when the Soviet government made that move.

Senator Humphrey. Yes.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Yes. I believe that the momentum to which I referred, that they had achieved following the fall of Saigon, encouraged just such an assumption on their part. And I believe that assumption was probably the key force in the decision to move in, to invade that independent, nonaligned neighboring country.

Now, I think that that momentum has not only been halted but thoroughly halted in the intervening four years. So I think the calculations and assumptions made by the Soviet leadership in 1979 would no longer be made by them today.

Senator Humphrey. Well, my question I guess in its essence is this: If the Soviets succeed in Sovietizing Afghanistan and incorporating Afghanistan into the Soviet empire, is it likely or unlikely that they will be satisfied with that gain or will they likely pursue this centuries-long thrust towards the Indian Ocean?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I do not believe, Senator Humphrey, that there is any basis for projecting probable future behavior except by the examination of past behavior and experience. I believe that history remains our

best guide, even remote history, but more especially the relatively recent history of the last decades. And I think that the position, for example, of Soviet forces today near the Iranian border and Pakistani border and the Chinese border and elsewhere in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean and the development of those substantial naval forces and so forth suggests that continued expansion aims must be considered at least as a reality, a probability, if not a certainty.

I think that whether those probabilities are acted upon is probably more dependent on our own policies than we like to imagine.

Senator Humphrey. Yes. That leads into my third question, which will be my last for now because I know my colleagues are anxious to have an opportunity to question you. That leads into my third question, and that is you stated that this is a matter of profound importance and that triumph for the Soviets is not inevitable and death for the Afghan people and nation is not inevitable. What should the West be doing in that case?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Humphrey, I would like to say, too, that my judgment is precisely the same for Cambodia and the people of Angola, in spite of the devastation of that suffering land and nation, under Pol Pot first and then under the Vietnamese invasion and occupation

and the puppet regime that that occupying force has established, the resistance of the Cambodian people to devastation and annihilation, extinction of the nation, continues very powerfully. And I believe that both the Afghan people and the Cambodian people will eventually prevail and avoid their own extinction and the extinction of their societies and cultures.

How can we help? Because it seems to me clearly there is a moral, political and geostrategic imperative really to help. I think that that problem is complex. I think there are various ways in which we can help, and I think all our efforts to help must be undertaken with great care and prudence and with full appreciation of the risk to the surrounding countries and their independence of our policies.

I think that, obviously, humanitarian assistance to these people is appropriate. Obviously, diplomatic solidarity is appropriate. Obviously, efforts such as are undertaken in the United Nations to rally world opinion I think are important. The Afghan leaders have told me these are important to them as they continue their struggle. It matters to them to understand that peoples in the world, great nations, small nations, sympathize with their struggle and are determined to stand with them. Obviously, all appropriate forms of assistance to those seeking to ensure the survival of the Afghan nation are important, and

obviously, they must be undertaken with full appreciation of the multiple values and parties to the struggle and in consultation with all other groups and governments who are affected by our assistance.

Senator Humphrey. Congressman Ritter.

Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, for a thoughtful and thorough presentation. I think there is a great deal of material in your testimony that requires further thought, further study, from our Task Force and by the press and the American people. We are deeply grateful for the work that you have put into today's testimony.

The Senator mentioned our obligation and you responded to that. Are we doing enough to inform the people in the Soviet Union of their government's action in Afghanistan? In other words, if one looks at the period of the Vietnam War and the political difficulties that our government faced internally, one suspected that that was a major reason for inability to conduct forceful policy. Wouldn't the corollary be true, in its own way, if the people of the Soviet Union were much better informed as to what was happening?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Congressman Ritter, may I say, first of all, I believe and have frequently said that the information instrument in foreign policy is certainly the cheapest, safest instrument available to us, and in a good

many contexts it is also the most important instrument available to us.

This is the reason, I might add, that I think it is so important to support and reinforce the U.S. support for our radio, for Radio Free Europe, for Radio Liberty, which is our principal instrument for communicating with the Soviet people, Radio Martin. But Radio Liberty is the only source of information that we Americans can provide the Soviets for information that their own government may not choose to give them and indeed, often, with regard to such troublesome matters as the invasion of Afghanistan, does not choose to give them.

I think that is important to do, important to continue. I know that Radio Liberty does that on a regular basis.

I think that it is also important to face realistically the fact that public opinion is a very different force in the Soviet Union than in the United States or any democratic society because even those people who are informed by their radios, and they are very substantial in number, those audiences are large, are not free to discuss with one another and to organize resistance movements and to publicly criticize the government and to seek to change government policy by publicity and lobbying and election competition in fact, so that I think simultaneously yes, it is important to provide information, but no, we cannot expect that the

consequences of that will be comparable to the consequences of providing information about an unpopular war to an American public or that of any other democratic nation.

Mr. Ritter. Thank you. I do understand the difference.

I would like to point out that in a not-too-long-ago, February 17th, edition of "Ukranian Weekly" they talked about the Ukrainian samvedat and they also talked about a Lithuanian samesedat. They talked about these samesedats, these self-underground publications I guess you would call them, in the Soviet Union, more and more are focusing on the cost to these various republics, nationalities, not necessarily affectionately related to Soviet domination, like the Ukranians and like the Baltics peoples, and how the government of the Soviet Union is keeping the information on casualties from the parents and the families of the people who have been killed.

For example, in Lithuania, a story is told about these zinc coffins come back closed and the families are not allowed to look in the zinc coffins. On one occasion the coffin was opened and it was supposed to be a son of a Lithuanian family and it turned out to be a Central Asian was in the coffin. Often the coffins are returned with absolutely no recognizable element of the person. At times these stories leak out.

I understand what you are saying. We are not about to

raise the level of public opinion to be equivalent to the level of public opinion in the United States, public opinion in the Soviet Union that is, but in terms of the morale of the people, their enthusiasm for this course, in terms of the morale of the Red Army itself, I believe we are not doing nearly enough to use the weapon of the truth to engage in the struggle of ideas, to perhaps supplement and compliment the cause of the Afghan people.

I think there is one other element here. Is there a major effort under way, and should there be a major effort under way, to communicate more directly with Soviet forces engaged on battlefields in Afghanistan and Soviet forces, as you say, deployed on the Central Asian border to the north?

We have heard stories of diminishing morale. It would seem to me that a telecommunications effort on the part of ourselves and perhaps our NATO allies, using ideas, the truth, could be remarkably effective in the midst of a situation where the morale is not exactly overwhelming. We hear many stories where Soviet soldiers are sent to Afghanistan to protect the Chinese. They never find the Chinese there. They are engaged in operations which are inhuman, and the morale is concomitantly reduced.

Are we doing enough in this regard? We know of the successes of Vladimir Rouskowsky and these little transportable radio units. Can't we with our great

telecommunications skills do more?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Congressman Ritter, certainly we can do essentially as much as we want to do because we have the telecommunications skill. We have the capacity. And so how much we do is a matter of political decision, in fact, rather than a matter of technological limitations.

I might just say that I think that our information effort is enormously important. The truth instrument is perhaps the most important instrument finally of all because I do think individuals make a difference, whether we are talking about the individual who will head the Politburo or talking about individual Soviet soldiers sent by their government to fight in Afghanistan.

I think it is terribly important that we adopt in thinking about these problems longer-range time frames ourselves and expect not immediate results, for example, from an information effort but anticipate that the long-range consequences of providing a fuller picture of reality to the Soviets whose lives are at risk, let's say in Afghanistan, may be very significant.

I think that is also true, if I may say so, for Cubans in places like Angola and Ethiopia who -- I was reminded by what you said about the Soviets -- were told they were going to fight Chinese but are not fighting Chinese, and the Cubans are told before they are shipped to Angola they are going to

be fighting white South Africans and they arrive only to find there are black Angolans they are confronting.

That kind of reality testing can be greatly supplemented by information about the nature of those struggles, provided both to the combatants themselves and to their societies, I think.

Mr. Ritter. Continuing on this one vein of using information as a lever in this Afghanistan situation, would the possibility exist of again using these direct broadcasts to Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the Central Asian area to encourage a larger scale of defection? If that is so, is it possible for us and, for example, the NATO nations, not just the United States alone, to set up safe havens for Soviet troops that defected?

Again I return to the idea of the some of the ethnic minorities fighting in Afghanistan, Ukranians, wouldn't the potential exist, and also given the worldwide communities these populations have outside the borders of the Soviet Union, wouldn't the potential exist to gain a wider rate of defection of Soviet soldiers?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I don't know. I really don't know.

Mr. Ritter. We will never know unless we try.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Obviously, in World War II, the Japanese thought so and invented people like Tokyo Rose and

the Germans thought so and they invented people like Lord Haha. We used radio communications to similar ends.

I would argue that it is worth doing. The information effort is important and deserves not only full support but perhaps reinforcement and stepping up, whether or not we know it will produce immediate defections, because of our confidence in the long-range benefits of a population more accurately informed by the policies of their own governments and by the nature of the world.

Mr. Ritter. It would seem that the alternative is a situation whereby the Soviet soldiers captured are treated with extreme harshness, which is something one can understand on the part of the Mujahideen, but that might be counterproductive also, the Soviet soldiers knowing of the extreme harshness that faces them.

I would say it is different from the Tokyo Rose and the Lord Haha, and what happened in Korea I think was an excellent example. I think it is different because the communist nationals -- they are not nationals -- people who live in totalitarian societies, are much more apt to defect than the reverse, and especially those nationalities who feel themselves repressed to begin with. It would seem that we haven't even begun to tap an approach that would open that nerve.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Congressman Ritter, I wholly

agree, let me say, and I would mention that through the United Nations and the International Red Cross, efforts have been made, of course, precisely to enhance and to, if possible, ensure the greater safety of Soviets taken as prisoners of war or taken as captives, captured by the Mujahideen. And as I am certain you know, certain Soviet prisoners were in fact transferred by the Mujahideen through the Red Cross to Switzerland. I think a trickle have returned to the Soviet Union now.

Mr. Ritter. Yes. And sometimes the conditions by which they are to meet with Soviet Ambassadors, and then they get the full lowdown on what awaits their families if they dare not return. I think that has some major impact on what we are trying to achieve.

Thank you very much, Madam Ambassador. I appreciate your testimony.

Senator Humphrey. Senator Symms.

Senator Symms. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my statement be made a part of the record at the appropriate place.

(The statement to be furnished follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

Senator Symms. I would compliment both you and members of the Task Force and certainly Ambassador Kirkpatrick for what I consider a very thoughtful and very important statement.

I think your point about the inevitability is most important because it is so often that the Soviet doctrine is based upon their belief that somehow it is inevitable they are going to go ahead and get Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the warm water ports, and so on and so forth. That is mentioned throughout their history.

I quite agree with you it is not inevitable. To accept it only becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

I can see a parallel. You mentioned Angola. I had the opportunity to visit Angola last year, in January of '84, and visited with Mr. Svende and others of the Aneta Group. There is a lot more going for them in terms of not starving and building hospitals and schools and growing farm crops than appears to be going on in Afghanistan. Maybe it is just the hardened climate and so forth. But I think that you make an outstanding point that we need to say it over and over again.

Now, how we transform that into policy, it is very difficult, how they can turn our moral support and hopefully some material support from the people of the United States to the Freedom Fighters in Afghanistan and actually have it work out to be successful. I am hopeful that will become a

reality.

But looking at history, when we look back at what happened with respect to World War II, with Korea, then with the Vietnam experience, I think the news point that you make is it is very difficult for us to transform that into successful policy in the Soviet Union.

I think that those of us on the Task Force should not be misled to somehow think we can -- and I agree with what you said, I think you are correct, that just to get the word out to the Soviet Union isn't going to have the same impact. We have a free news press. We have a free news media in the United States. Certainly if you look at the history of the Vietnam conflict, it probably had more to do with us losing the war than what happened in Vietnam, because of the public support that was generated at home.

So I think where we have to concentrate is here in the United States to be sure that the American people recognize the moral importance of us supporting people like the Mujahideen, Jonas Svende, other great, gallant Freedom Fighters in different parts of the world, that are in fact fighting for our freedom.

I wonder if you would not agree with that, that it is critical that we appreciate it here and from there it will expand, that we can never allow people who are fighting for freedom to feel abandoned and left for not.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Symms, I would like to say that I think perhaps the most striking single aspect of the political history of the period from 1975 to 1980 was the expansion of Soviet influence, client states control, into new areas of the world.

I believe that perhaps the most important political event of the last five years may in retrospect turn out to be the growth during this last five-year period of resistance forces to Soviet hegemony, to use that word, that had been established in the previous decades. Those resistance forces represent I believe the determination of peoples to protect their rights to self-determination and national independence, which are guaranteed them by the United Nations Charter and by civilized international relations, and they represent the determinations of people scheduled for incorporation and extinction, really, to preserve their own identity.

I think that the growth of the resistance forces and the tenacity of the resistance forces on the Thai border, for example, in the Kampuchean, Cambodian resistance forces, is very striking. When I was in Southeast Asia last year, in China and Southeast Asia, I was very much struck by the repeated assertions and confidence of the people in that region that eventually the Cambodian resistance forces will prevail, that eventually, and that is in a long-range time frame, the Vietnamese will be led to withdraw their occupying

forces from Cambodia.

I think that the growth of resistance forces in Ethiopia and in Angola and in Mozambique have been very striking and very important political developments in Africa. The development of resistance forces and the growth of resistance forces in Nicaragua is surely one of the most important political facts of the last three years in Central America.

I think that the growing effectiveness of the Mujahideen and its increased coordination and operational effectiveness is one of the basic political military facts of Afghanistan in the last two years. And I think that the most striking aspect of all of these facts is that they do demonstrate that conquest of peoples is not inevitable and they do demonstrate the continuation of a will to freedom and self-determination and national independence of peoples, even under the most extraordinarily difficult and terrible of circumstances.

Senator Symms. I thank you very much.

I would just like to say further, Mr. Chairman, if one looks back at where we were in the middle seventies, when the United States was unwilling to support our friends and oppose our enemies, and we literally jerked the rug out from under the government of South Vietnam and the Cambodian government and left them to dangle and ultimately brought about defeat, we have come a long ways in the last five- or six-year period. I think it is a great improvement.

I would hope that we would even see a time we could continue to gain encouragement and those people who are the resistance can gain encouragement that the United States would take it one step further and recognize someone like, for example, a Jonas Svende as the legitimate leader of Angola and give him full diplomatic recognition and say in fact, "You are our friend, you are the leader of Angola, and we hereby recognize you," and make that the legitimate person that we recognize.

I think with just one or two examples the whole African continent would fall back to the West.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator, may I comment? I almost forgot, I neglected to mention what is perhaps the most dramatic of all the resistance movements to emerge in the last five years, and that is of course Solidarity. I would like to correct my own record to simply show my profound cognizance and respect for the people of Poland in their determination to assert simply a decent right to manage their own affairs and express themselves.

I would like, too, if I may, with regard to your comment on Angola, to say that in retrospect, it seems to me that the action of the Congress through what is called the Clark Amendment, in prohibiting any U.S. assistance to the resistance forces of Angola, constituted nothing more or less than not only the agreement of the United States with the

Brezhnev doctrine but a kind of commitment of the United States to become a coenforcer of the Brezhnev doctrine. That is certainly a position which is utterly incompatible with the American commitment to freedom with our tradition of Solidarity, of Freedom Fighters, and with our brothers who fight for their own rights, too, the freedom and self-determination in the world, as President Regan has said.

Mr. Ritter. Would the gentleman yield?

Senator Symms. Yes.

Mr. Ritter. I think it is crucial. In your testimony you talked about the momentum that led the Soviets to believe in this correlation of forces, favorable to invading Afghanistan, the first direct military engagement of the military troops since the Second World War. I mean where else could you epitomize such an action on behalf of the West than in the Clark Amendment in Angola?

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Senator Symms. I think that is a very key point. If you look back, this started a long time ago. We had a constant devolution of our willingness to stand with resistance movements.

I think President Reagan has been an enormous psychological lift to Freedom Fighters throughout the world by his presence, and last week in his speech where he recognized General Saphe in the audience and said, "I am with

you." That means a lot to people around the world. When you look at the cooperation, and you call it compliance, and I forget your word there, with Angola, the same thing was true all through the sixties with respect to Castro. There were people who wanted to have a revolution in Cuba and actually to carry out the commitment of the revolution, much as is going on in Nicaragua today to gain the freedom people were seeking, and the United States always interfered, would never allow those people to resist in Cuba and give them the base of operation. So we in fact protected Castro's building of a Soviet puppet state right in our own back yard because of our failure to support our friends and oppose our enemies.

I might point out it was in President Kennedy's speech where that line came from, yet those policies were never carried out during the eight years of the Kennedy-Johnson administration. It continued on through until 1980, a constant devolution of our ability to recognize if we are going to maintain our freedom. If people like the Afghans are going to be able to again gain their freedom back and live in sovereignty, then they must have the moral and material support of the American people. Without it, the world has very little hope. I think with it the world has all the hope that we could expect.

I thank you very much and I thank Chairman Humphrey for his efforts to focus attention. There is no place more on

the front line for freedom and liberty than Afghanistan. If we won't support them now, God help us. Thank you.

Senator Humphrey. Madam Ambassador, if I may refer to your printed testimony, on page 19, you cite the cases of the once independent Muslim states of Khiva and Bokara which are now part of the Soviet Union. Page 19, at the top. We also know, of course, that the other south central parts of the Soviet Union also experienced these same Soviet tactics back in the twenties and thirties, when following the communist revolution the people of that region resisted.

What I am getting at here is this question: Do you see these tactics now being employed mercilessly and steadily on a long-term basis in Afghanistan as something new or do they have antecedence in prior and similar campaigns by the Soviets in that region?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think that it is important to face the continuity of the policy in Afghanistan with some previous policies. It is important both to recognize the continuity of Soviet policy in Afghanistan with some previous policies and also, though, to recognize the extent to which it constituted a rupture with the policies of the post World War II period.

The Soviet Union underwent, of course, three periods of rapid expansion. The first period was immediately following the conquest of the power by the Bolsheviks after the

Bolshevik so-called revolution, which was really a coup d'etat, in which the peoples, for example, of the Ukraine and Bularousia were incorporated and also in 1922 the people of Khiva and Bokara and so forth, the so-called autonomous Soviet socialist republics, many of whom are filled with peoples who would prefer in fact to live --

Senator Humphrey. Be autonomous.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. -- would perhaps prefer, in any case, to maintain a more independent status. They didn't have the choice, that is the point. The point is they were incorporated by force.

The second period of expansion, of course, came after World War II when the countries of Eastern Europe were, in my opinion, incorporated into the Soviet bloc and integrated into the Soviet rule, not much less because of the Yalta Agreement than because of the presence of the Soviet Red Army in Eastern Europe. And it it was in the shadow of the Red Army that those incorporations took place.

The third period of expansion I think came in that 1975 through 1979 period which we have been discussing. And I think each of those periods has something in common with the previous one or they have something in common with each other.

However, I also think it is important to emphasize that the Soviet leadership has not displayed tendencies towards

reckless policy. They have in fact I think displayed characteristics of rather prudent, sober leadership interested in expansion but ready to run only limited risks in the process. And that is why I think it is so terribly important that the invasion of Afghanistan be understood as the first decision of its kind after World War II and as the culmination of a period in which a great deal of Soviet momentum was developed in its expansion.

I think it was that momentum which led them to believe that they could in fact expand without paying too high a price or without any very serious consequences. I think it is a terribly important lesson for us to learn because I think it is filled with lessons for us in the conduct of our policy with the Soviet Union. I think if we are strong and clear, then they are not likely, in fact, to run risks for expansion, and that if we are not, they are likely to. I believe this period of '75 through '80 illustrates that fact quite clearly.

I also think, though, that we need to be aware of the repeated indications that where the opportunity to do so exists at an apparently low price, they will take advantage of it.

Senator Humphrey. Yes. You say this is yet another example of pursuing prudent and nonreckless initiatives. That would seem to suggest that there are some constraints

upon the Soviets themselves that they have vulnerabilities themselves. Would you agree with that?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Oh, of course.

Senator Humphrey. What are those vulnerabilities to reckless which prevent them from engaging in reckless -- there is a difference between reckless and cruel. What they are doing is unspeakably cruel. But they are doing it in a very calculated, long-term, they hope low profile way so as not to play against their own vulnerabilities. What do you see as their own vulnerabilities?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think those vulnerabilities are above all economic and ideological. Economic because the Soviet economy just doesn't work very well. The Soviet model for development is not a model for development. It is in fact a model for failure in economic development. And I think their ideological vulnerability derives above all from the extent to which the reality of the daily lives of Soviet citizens and their own concrete experience does not square with the official interpretations of that experience, which are offered by the Soviet media frequently.

So I think those are each very important vulnerabilities, potential vulnerabilities. But I think the Soviet leadership has in fact been realistic in understanding both its own strengths and its own weaknesses and acting in a way that consolidates strength and minimizes costs and risks.

Senator Humphrey. We know that the Soviets have not much regard for western public opinion. Do the Soviets care about the public opinion in the Third World and in particular in the Islamic world?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think that the Soviet Union is concerned about public opinion everywhere, including at home, by the way. This is why they spend more money jamming our Voice of America broadcasts or our Radio Liberty broadcasts than we, of course, spend in trying to transmit our messages.

I think they care a lot about opinion at home and a lot about opinion in the world. I think their investments, for example, in information and disinformation campaigns in the world are very large, many times ours.

One can see, for example, at the United Nations that there is a continuous effort on the part of the Soviet Union to manipulate and control information, all because I think they are terribly interested in influencing public opinion in the United States, in the Third World and, indeed, at home for them.

Senator Humphrey. Is there a particular opportunity, however, in the context of this occupation and brutalization of Afghanistan, to use public opinion in the Third World and the Islamic world against the Soviets, to put pressure on them? Is there a particular opportunity here?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Yes and no, Senator Humphrey, in my opinion. I believe that the opportunity exists all the time. I truly believe that the opportunity to inform the Muslim peoples, for example, of Central Asia and of the other parts of the Muslim world about the treatment of minorities in the Soviet Union. The realities of everyday life for Muslims under communism is omnipresent for us. That opportunity exists in every Muslim population all the time, and it is obviously deeply relevant to the struggle.

Senator Humphrey. The Soviet goal in Afghanistan, as it was before in south central Soviet Union, is to Sovietize, which means in plain English to destroy the traditional values and to destroy Islam in that part of the Soviet empire. Do you see that as their goal likewise in Afghanistan, to not simply dominate but to Sovietize, to destroy the values and destroy Islam?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Oh, yes. And I think this is manifest in the efforts, deliberate efforts in the transformation of the educational system at all levels that I described and in the control of culture. Absolutely manifest.

Senator Humphrey. Is the Soviet Union not the most anti-Islamic nation in the world in terms of invasion and persecution?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think it is quite clear that

the Marxist-Leninist systems and those associated with the Soviet Union demonstrate a continuing and nearly implacable hostility to religions of all kinds.

Senator Humphrey. All right. Is there anything new, Madam Ambassador, in the use by the Soviets of famine to achieve their ends of Sovietization and subjugation and incorporation?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think it was the Ukrainian famine, which has been described as the first manmade famine in human history, that Ukrainian famine which was, of course, an important tactic in the incorporation of the Ukraine into the Soviet Union, was perhaps the first deliberate use of famine and starvation as an instrument of political policy. I think the expansion of that to the decollectivization strategy during the collectivization drive under Stalin provides another example of the deliberate use of starvation as a political instrument. And, of course, today I think we see in Ethiopia some effort at the use of what might be called food as a weapon and starvation as an instrument of policy.

So the concept of using starvation as an instrument for the consolidation of control over populations is by no means a new one.

Senator Humphrey. By the Soviets.

Just a comment, not a question. No response is

necessary or even asked. But I find it ironic that this week the White House entertained Vladimir Sharminsky, who is credited or accused perhaps I should say, of being responsible for organizing the famine and the suffering of the people of the Ukraine, in the very week when an Afghan Freedom Fighter, Commander Abdul Hauk, a genuine hero, visited the White House and was not permitted to see the President.

I think speaking of public policy, public diplomacy, I should say no better example exists of the ineffective and half-hearted public policy efforts by the Administration than the example I have just cited.

Madam Ambassador, one last question. I want to again focus on this matter of whether the Soviets are bogged down or whether in fact their strategy is succeeding. Some say that because the Freedom Fighters control 80 percent of the country, that shows that they are winning and the Soviets are losing. Do the Soviets in fact have a strategy that requires or, indeed, seeks to control most of the countryside or is their strategy limited to controlling strategic facilities such as power plants and radio transmitters and things of that kind on the one hand while destroying through carpet bombing and every measure of terror the ability of the resistance to continue? Do the Soviets have a strategy to control that covers the entire countryside? Does it matter

they they control only 20 percent?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. It matters in the short range sense but it doesn't matter in the long range if the strategy is indeed, as many observers believe, to control urban areas and strategic facilities within urban areas and outside them, while rubbleizing, while driving millions of Afghans out of the countryside and transforming the Afghan way of life throughout the country. As long as there is a long-range time frame of the sort I have emphasized I think the Soviets have, then I think that it is necessary to face the fact that that strategy may work in the long run, even though it seems that the Soviets make only very limited progress in the short run.

Now I would like to emphasize, too, that I don't think that success is inevitable. I am quite certain it is not.

Senator Humphrey, since I am here as a member of the Administration, may I please comment on your comment about the President's receiving --

Senator Humphrey. Certainly. It wasn't my wish to put you in an awkward spot.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I would like to say that I believe really quite sincerely that there are special problems associated with the choice that you described about whom the President would see and whom he would not see. I believe that Mr. Sharminsky was here as an official and very

high level representative of the Soviet government, and it is important that the United States have decorous relations with the Soviet government.

We are not in a position to choose those representatives. It is the Soviet government who chooses them. It was suggested, for example, that Premier Andropov was responsible for the assassination plot against the Pope and a good deal of evidence pointed in that direction, and yet it would have been necessary, had the occasion presented itself, for the United States certainly to receive him.

I think one has to see people in those roles as ex officio simply. However unpleasant that may be, I think that is a necessity in the relations among nations.

I think also that in relationship to the President's receiving Afghan Freedom Fighters and their commanders, I would like to make two points. One, it is very well understood that the President fully supports in his personal sympathy those Freedom Fighters. He has very great empathy, solidarity and admiration for them. And second, it is also complicated by the fact, as you know, you are more sensitive to than I perhaps even, that the United States has diplomatic relations with the government of Afghanistan and that creates a sensitive situation.

Senator Humphrey. I would love to engage you in a debate on this matter. I don't want to. Let me announce

when we invited Ambassador Kirkpatrick some months ago, it was anticipated by both sides by now she would be once again a private citizen. So I don't wish to place you in a more awkward position than I might have already, unwittingly. So I will just let it drop for the moment at this formum.

Congressman Ritter.

Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The American people have spoken on this subject. Their representatives in the Senate and in the House have passed what is known as the Tsongas-Ritter Resolution which encompasses some language to the effect that the Administration should effectively assist the Afghan Freedom Fighters.

In order to make the American people more aware of what is happening in Afghanistan and some of the details as it impacts them, what would you suggest? It is obvious, or is it, that our defense expenditures would be magnified if all of a sudden there was a Sovietized Afghanistan holding that high ground above South Asia a few days from Gwadar and through Palishistan, with ten airfields at present. How can we better get the message across to the American people of not only this moral, not only humanitarian, but really almost self-serving geostrategic long-range historic importance?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Congressman Ritter, I think that is a very important point that is present in your

question. It is very important, I think, that the American people be aware and informed about the extent to which foreign policy decisions made today impact on our security situation and on our defense budgets and on our alliance structures in subsequent years.

I think that it is certainly true that a fully consolidated Sovietized Afghanistan would, as I indicated in my statement, have profound implications and deeply negative consequences for the stability and security of the region, potentially. Again, not inevitably but potentially. Certainly it would have important implications for the defense and security system for the region. Certainly it would be expensive to us.

I suggested, if I may say, without changing the subject, that it would be useful if someone would try to estimate what the cost has been in dollars and cents to the United States of the presence of an expansionist Sandinista government in Nicaragua the past five years. That cost is in billions already. So far as I know, no one has estimated that cost simply in dollars and cents, regardless of its cost to security and human misery.

The cost in dollars and cents, as well as in human misery and security, of a fully Sovietized Afghanistan would certainly be very high.

I think it is terribly important that these problems be

shared with the American people. Terribly important.

These are not, in my opinion, questions of foreign policy most appropriately confined to discussion in closed rooms by a few experts. These are questions of foreign policy which have the most profound implications for American taxpayers and American citizens in years to come. They deserve to share the problem and the information and the decision with the rest of us.

Mr. Ritter. Thank you. In terms of the possibilities of diplomatic pressure, although one wonders why a Muslim Third World nation even talks to the Soviet Union, given what the Soviets have done to a brother Muslim nation, but given the possibilities of diplomatic pressure, what is the quid pro quo that the Soviets get for withdrawal, given the long-term digging in of their policy, the 10,000 children to the Soviet Union, the policy of enforced rubbleization, destruction of the infrastructure? What do the Soviets get other than walking away from a fight with a bloody nose?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think that the Soviet Union, which is, after all, a society with the most widely diverse ethnic composition, and a very large Muslim population, and a large number of Muslim nations, the Soviet Union by accepting the kind of settlement provided in the UN resolution could win better relations with all their neighbors, greater respect for the world, relations with her neighbors based not

simply on intimidation or mutual intimidation or fear but relations based on cooperation and genuine respect.

In the long run, if we looked at a still longer run time frame, the Soviet Union itself might profit by such relations with the government, in relations with her own Muslim population, and with her Muslim neighbors. Certainly the peace of the world would be enhanced. Certainly the Soviets stand to gain by that as well as all the rest of us.

Mr. Ritter. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I would like to believe that and I know a lot of people would like to believe that that were a possibility. I guess what I would caution either the American people or the rest of the world is seeing that eventuality emerge prominently on the horizon in the near future.

I think, as you stated, the model for economic development promoted by the Soviet Union is a model for Third World failure, and that the alternative course that they take perhaps is precisely because their economic model is so disastrous, and that this is their alternative as a power in the world today; that if we expect them to somehow deny their only successes, we may be waiting a very long time.

There was one other point, the death of Chernenko promoting the possibility of something happening over Afghanistan. I don't want to rain on anybody's parade, but the times of succession in the Soviet Union have always been

marked by jockeying and solidification of power bases. What is happening in the party regions and who is supporting whom?

It is, I think, a period of pronounced status quo, but the possibility of someone once established coming up with another posture is finite, although given what we have learned, probably small. The only real possibility in my mind, after following this for five years, having lived in the Soviet Union, having studied the Russian language, culture, literature, music, the only real possibility is upping the ante for Soviet forces in Afghanistan. And that is a grim possibility, but probably the only realistic one.

I know that sounds like a speech, but you can get sidetracked out of mainstreams. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.

Senator Humphrey. Madam Ambassador, we are very grateful for your presence here today and that you might come and lend your expertise to this important matter. We are also, as always, impressed by your forthright nature. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Senator, Congressman.

Senator Humphrey. While the Ambassador is leaving, we will call our next panel to the table, please.

(Brief recess.)

Senator Humphrey. May we have order, please.

Our next witnesses on the agenda printed are Alex

Alexiev, Social Scientist and Consultant for the Rand Corporation, who is appearing on his own behalf; Yossef Bodansky, a Soviet military expert; and Dr. Thomas E. Gouttierre, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska at Omaha.

We will begin with Mr. Gouttierre. You don't have a huge statement here, do you? You may proceed as you wish, please. Mr. Alexiev is absent so you start first.

STATEMENTS OF ALEX ALEXIEV, SOCIAL SCIENTIST, RAND CORPORATION; YOSSEF BODANSKY, SOVIET MILITARY EXPERT; DR. THOMAS E. GOUTTIERRE, CENTER FORAFGHANISTAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA

Dr. Gouttierre. I am going to start by first of all commending you, Senator Humphrey, and also Congressman Ritter for your parts in seeing that these hearings are held.

I think that as you addressed us all earlier, you indicated the importance, and it has been reiterated in the statements made by Ambassador Kirkpatrick and others of your colleagues, that the public awareness of what is going on in Afghanistan is something that is very, very important to all of us in terms of what we might expect in the future relating to this war.

I think that through five years those of us long associated with the war in Afghanistan were dismayed that

there was really no public awareness. I think the last year has seen a tremendous increase in the public interest and awareness of what is going on in Afghanistan. And I personally am most pleased to see this develop because I recognize and recognized years ago this was to be a very important part of the whole equation relating to Afghanistan.

I think that in studying the situation on Afghanistan, and I know my two fellow panel members will be taking a look at matters relating to the Soviet strategy and the Soviet military tactics in Afghanistan, I wanted to, of course, focus on the Afghan quotient itself.

I think that most of us are now well aware of the country of Afghanistan and the Afghan people. We recognize them today as a very brave people, a people who are doing the kinds of things that perhaps the Czechs and the Hungarians and also Poles in years not too distant in our past have failed to be able to accomplish. They are fighting with a tenacity that I think is unparalleled in recent memory.

And there are many models that are constructed, many examples that are used about the way countries on the periphery of the Soviet Union, whether they were in the Caucasian area or whether they were in Mongolia or in Central Asia and the way in which they were subjugated by the Soviet Union.

I think many of these models have interesting examples.

But I think that they depart from the reality of Afghanistan. The environmental and cultural differences I think are significant.

Today I am going to focus just briefly on some of these differences and why I feel they are very important in considering the situation in Afghanistan and the eventual devolution there.

I think today you are able to find individuals who will say essentially the war is over, that the Soviets are now consolidating their position in Afghanistan and will continue to do that into the future. People who cite these particular kinds of things would like to point out that the cost to the Soviet Union itself in Afghanistan is not significant enough to encourage them to depart.

I think that there is a very strong element of truth in that. But I think also we must take a look very decidedly at the Afghan quotient itself. I think most people when they talk about resolution of a situation in Afghanistan, when they talk about the factors that are important in bringing about an end to the situation in Afghanistan, the war in Afghanistan, talk often about a big power situation, the Soviet Union itself and its commitment, and there is very little understanding of the strengths that the Afghans themselves bring to this war.

I have prepared, as you know, a paper for the hearing

here, and I am not going to use that in my remarks. I am going to just point out a number of the salient factors that I wish to address at this opportunity.

I think the primary negative factors that are influencing the situation in Afghanistan as it relates to the Afghans themselves are certainly numerous. There is some success in the Sovietization campaign, not certainly as successful as the Soviets would themselves wish. But if one takes a look at historical evolution as a way of Sovietization of Afghanistan from the very beginning, from the assistance to the Afghan government and infiltration both in the bureaucratic and economic sectors as well as the military, one can see a ragtag pattern and one can also see a pattern emerging that would provide for even a further Sovietization.

I think Congressman Ritter pointed out very accurately the Soviet strategy of depopulation. I think that particular strategy is a very key element to the whole Soviet approach and that the success of Sovietization itself will be very dependent on that.

One might also take a look at the apparent disunity of the Afghan groups as a negative factor. One might also take a look at the fact that within Afghanistan itself, the lack of communication between the resistance groups, though increasing, still remains somewhat of a negative factor.

The fact there has been no real opportunity or move towards the development of a government in exile for the Afghans, the inability to come to some kind of agreement on that point, has to be taken into context as a negative factor.

I think perhaps the most negative factor relating to the potential of the Afghans to resist into the future is the economic weaknesses that are developing and that people have already addressed here that have to do with the scorched earth tactics you both mentioned. These certainly provide for the long-term future of the Afghans a tremendous challenge to all of us who are concerned about the outcome of this war.

I think we need very much to look into this. I know that your previous hearings did. I hope that this particular aspect, in other words the humanitarian concerns, combatting the scorched earth tactics that have been used, also looking into the need for education and medicine as well, will not be a matter that will have only passing interest.

Finally, I think in terms of those things that are having a negative impact on the Afghan ability to persist in this resistance, the Soviet strategies and tactics themselves are becoming more and more successful. I am not saying again that the war is over as a result or that the Soviets have won. But there is certainly evidence that the Soviet tactics

are having that kind of impact that Congressman Ritter pointed out in terms of the depopulation and the migratory genocide. These are certainly in the long term factors which would I think bear some advantage to the Soviets themselves.

But now let me just set those aside and let Yossef and Mr. Alexiev address these more in the future in their presentations. I would like to take a look quickly at some of the very positive factors.

I think we need to understand that the Afghans bring to this war factors which are very positive in their ability to sustain the resistance. These are factors that don't exist in all of the other examples and models that people like to call upon, whether they be in the Caucasian area or whether they be in Central Asia or in Mongolia.

I think, for example, to take a look at one of these historical factors, the Afghans take a look at history as they perceive it themselves, not necessarily as it was lived. They tend to feel themselves as having prevailed over other imperialist efforts or attempts at their country during the nineteen hundreds and early part of this century. People don't tend in Afghanistan to look over the specific details of the three Afghan wars but they tend to remember those as wars in which they have prevailed.

That myth, whether it is fact or fiction, is one that the Afghans themselves carry into this war. It is a very

important part of their historical culture as they go into this battle. It is one that I think wasn't necessarily available in many of the other kinds of resistance movements which have been waged against the Russians, whether they be Czarist or Soviet in the past.

Environmental factors, I think these are very important, too. When you take a look at Central Asia, you see essentially a landscape which is much more conducive to use of armies, tanks, and things of this nature, rather than perhaps that which we see in Afghanistan. The valleys and mountains and caves and the kind of living structure which the Afghans have relied on for years I think in many ways form a very positive factor in this particular equation.

The social institutions of the Afghans, particularly the strong family institutions, the tribal institutions, these are hard to penetrate in terms of trying to subdue or to try to overcome through Sovietization. I think that when one takes a look at the attempts by the Soviets to penetrate Afghanistan, particularly in the last three decades, one has seen that most of the penetration has been at the military and urban levels and not in the village and tribal areas, the family and tribal areas, which I think are very, very important.

There is a personal character which the Afghans bring to this war, one in which they glorify the image of the poet

warrior, one that again draws upon this historical culture which I think the Afghans readily utilize as a resource in their commitment to this fight, and as well the cultural traditions which are a part of this.

The political institutions in Afghanistan are ones which most people denegrate. They tend to see Afghanistan as a ragtag country of tribal groupings that have fought throughout their long history. People are not aware of the fact that there is a certain sophisticated democratic approach to resolving regional, local and tribal differences.

The Afghans have built up a culture of learning how to accommodate and to reach compromise. They have even developed certain institutional elements of a governmental nature which, although they may be opposed to strong central government, still has its own institutional composition.

These are important to understand, that in dealing with the Afghans, we are not talking about an unsophisticated group of ragtag bandits, as the Soviets present them, as the western press primarily characterizes them, as uncivilized rebels.

I think this is not the case, that there is much more cultural sophistication, political sophistication, both in the village culture in the north and the also the tribal culture of the south and southeast.

The current politics in Arghanistan certainly also

constitute a positive element in this whole think. The Afghan Communist Party, the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, has been unable to come together no matter what the prodding from the Soviets. These things are falling primarily along traditional lines.

This is not a devolution relating to current political considerations but these are related to things that are traditional, that have to do with tribal and linguistic things as much as other factors.

The economic institutions of Afghanistan are also another positive element in this whole equation. We tend to point out the economic weaknesses that are caused by Soviet scorched earth tactics, but also we have to remember that for Afghan and that is a serious weakness.

But we also have to remember on the positive side of that ledger that the Afghan economy has been strongly agrarian -- it is not dependent upon the collapse of the urban economy which has been building recently in Afghanistan -- and that the Afghans have the strength and the strategy, essentially, and their long history and cultural approach to economy that will help them I think be able to combat these scorched earth tactics of the Soviet Union. They need additional external support, but I think this is also very important.

Religion obviously is a very positive element in this

whole equation. I think that the fact that many people bring to focus that the Afghans are not all Suni but some are Shiite, or whatever, is not as important as the fact that there is a commonality in the cultural practice of religion in Afghanistan and the fact that in Afghanistan, Islam is as much a cultural way of life as it is just a religious way of life. It is a very important part of the strength of the Afghan people, that the differences that one might like to focus upon relating to being either Shiite or Suni are not as significant here as the cultural similarities.

Senator Humphrey. I would have to ask you to wind it up.

Dr. Gouttierre. I am nearly finished. Just a last couple of important elements.

In taking a look at this, the external aid the Afghans have been receiving is certainly something that is positive. I hope and I have confidence that in the near future this particular element will be increasing.

Finally, I think that it is important to take a look at what the Afghans themselves are trying to obtain by their long-term right. I think that they are realistic enough to understand that the war in Afghanistan would have to include a definition of U.S.S.R. security interests vis-a-vis Afghanistan. But they are determined that no resolution of this war would include the defining of the nature of the

government in Afghanistan.

I think this is a very important thing that we need to keep in mind. The Afghans again have been fighting a war for five years. This particular fight has sophisticated them in their understanding of how to approach a resolution of this war. They are utilizing those particular resources that are at hand for them and that are not easy to find in other models that have been combatting the Soviets in the past. And I think that these are things that we need to take into constant consideration.

My greatest fear is that the swinging pendulum of American politics, which is very much swinging in favor of the Afghans today, and the concern about resistance movements against Soviet imperialism around the world, will swing back again. I think that the Afghans themselves are as concerned about that particular element as anything else.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you.

(The statement follows:)

Senator Humphrey. Let me interrupt the procedure here for a few minutes. I want to acknowledge a statement which will be entered into the record in an appropriate place by Congressman Robert Lagomarsino, a valued member of this Task Force, who is absent today for necessary reasons, who would have been here had the Congress been in session today.

(The statement follows:)

Senator Humphrey. Likewise, I want to refer to these charts, since a member of my staff went to great trouble to make these up over the weekend, even sleeping on my couch in my office, I am told.

Dr. Ron Sinocoff is our cartologist. Ron, will you come up and use the pointer or something while I read this statement?

Afghanistan is located at the crossroads of South Asia and its strategic location has forced Afghan people for centuries to ward off encroaching invaders. Its borders stand in the way of long held Far East and Soviet quests for a warm water port on the Arabian Sea.

Stretching across the vast expansion of western Pakistan and eastern Iran is land inhabited by some 500 Baluchi tribesmen called Baluchistan. A look at this map clearly indicates the extreme importance of Baluchistan, which commands greater than 900 miles of the Arabian Sea. Baluchistan is also a region of strong Soviet influence which has been nurtured over the past two decades.

Southern Afghanistan and Baluchistan form a natural land corridor to the Arabian Sea where topographic relief is minimal when compared to northern Afghanistan.

This land corridor would provide the Soviets with easy access to their long cherished warm water port in the Arabian Sea, were they to succeed in conquering Afghanistan.

To further appreciate the strategic importance of Afghanistan, one need only look at Afghanistan's close proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic chokepoint for the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the West and Japan.

Over the past few years the Soviets have fortified their strategic infrastruture inside Afghanistan, expanding and building new air bases. A MIG 25 reconnaissance jet leaving from a number of air bases in southern Afghanistan could run a single overflight reconnaissance in the Persian Gulf and return to Afghanistan within two hours. A fighter aircraft could perform a strike mission in the Persian Gulf within the same time period.

With addition of tankers, these same aircraft and others could perform long-term surveillance and air strikes in the Persian Gulf.

Additionally, the ability to conduct military operations out of Afghanistan would reduce Soviet dependence on their naval forces in the Indian and Arabian Sea.

Thank you, Dr. Sinocoff.

Let me say also that I have read in full the statements of each of our witnesses, and I thank you for submitting them ahead of time. That is a great help.

I hope, however, that especially in the case of Mr. Bodansky, you are not going to treat us to a recitation

of your entire statement since it is quite lengthy. I have read it in its entirety and have underlined certain portions, as I have in the case of other testimony, and intend to ask you about it. But I wish that you would give us a briefer synopsis.

Mr. Bodansky. Thank you, Senator Humphrey. I would like to address the whole problem of Soviet perception of the issue. From their perspective, the current Soviet activities in Afghan are a direct evolution of the age-old Russian imperialism.

The relentless advance into Asia emerged from the struggle of the Slavic population for fertile lands and has eventually become the focal point of the Russian and Soviet expansionism and imperialism. The Russians and Soviets have perceived their advance into Central Asia as the only means short of a major confrontation in Europe in which their land-based military might can be translated into tangible strategic gains.

Since the mid-1820s, the Russians have believed that the European powers would acquiesce to any occupation of a Central Asian country because such a country was not worthy of a European war. The Soviet nomenklatura wants victory, not war. The Soviets are determined to continue their historic consolidation of power through the persistant drive into Asia.

Senator Humphrey. I am sorry; your voice is still not carrying. Your testimony is very important. So excuse me for interrupting, but pull the microphone closer, please.

Mr. Bodansky. As a result of the bitter legacy of the Mongol invasion, the great Russians have always perceived their struggle with the Turkic population of Central Asia in terms of KTO-KOGO, or who gets whom. In such a struggle there can be no compromises or even pauses. The Muslim Turks and the Russians have been in contact for a thousand years, during which time relations have been mostly hostile. Any attempt to find yet another "peaceful" solution, whether based on Marxism-Leninism or not, is feared by both sides.

The Russian and Soviet advance into Central and Southwest Asia is the expression of the quest for power by the ruling elite. The legacy of the "Tatar Yoke" has determined the ferocity and persistence of the Russiain and Soviet drive into Asia.

The essence of the Russian and Soviet military strategy has been the rapid consolidation of control over the local strategic objectives, and only then the beginning of a lengthy and gradual submission of the local Muslim population.

The Russians have always adhered to the Kazakh proverb: "It takes 50 years to remold a people." The current Soviet activities in Afghanistan clearly indicate that the Soviet

goals and priorities have not changed. On the basis of the accumulating Russian and Soviet experience since the early 18th century, they define the preconditions for the occupation of Muslim territories and the suppression of the local insurrection and resistance:

(1) The destruction of the local leadership, and especially its ability to achieve unity.

(2) The erosion of popular bases through the destruction of the local social and economical infrastructure.

(3) The effective isolation of the region.

The application of these preconditions is the key to the current Soviet success in Afghanistan.

The Soviet primary goals in Afghanistan are maintaining and securing their power-projection strategic infrastructure, securing a showcase safe Kabul, and the prevention of escalation of the resistance activities from Pakistan.

The Soviets themselves admit that they do not control the entire cuontry and have not attempted to capture it. The Soviets claim control over only 25 percent of the territory, concede that the resistance controls 10 percent, and define the rest, 65 percent, as being no-man's-land.

This Soviet definition reflects the current situation in Afghanistan fairly accurately. Thus, the Russian adn Soviet military strategy has been formulated to facilitate only the rapid consolidation of control over the militarily

significant infrastructure, denying it to their enemy, rather than to control the entire territory and pacify the local population.

Since 1978 there have been three major Soviet decisionmaking events in which the Soviet-Afghan policy was determined.

(1) Spring of 1978 -- the recognition of Afghanistan as a socialist state and the extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine to it.

(2) Spring of 1980 -- the realization that Soviet forces have to remain in Afghanistan indefinitely and that the main goal for their deployment is to further Soviet strategic and global interests.

(3) Winter of 1983-1984 -- the realization that Afghanistan is a developing traditionalist Muslim society and that the intensifying Muslim insurrection might become a threat to the stability of the Muslim population of the U.S.S.R.

The essence of these perceptions of Afghanistan is the key to understanding the Soviet approach to Afghanistan and to Central and Southwest Asia as a whole.

The Soviets considered the invasion as a further development of a predetermined process. The Soviet forces

that entered Afghanistan were organized for a brief stay among a friendly and safe population, which was not the case.

As of mid-1980, the resistance could not prevent the Soviets from doing whatever they wanted in Afghanistan, provided they were willing to pay the price. Professor Rabbani, the leader of Jamiat-i-Islami, admitted that "The Soviets feel comfortable in Afghanistan." At the height of routine military operations, only 15 percent of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan were committed to fighting the resistance.

As with the rest of the highly successful Russian and Soviet subversion activities among Muslim nationalities and ethnical groups in the last 200 years, the current Soviet campaign is based on an indigenous rift with a long heritage of enmities and flareups, but it is completely distorted in order to further Soviet designs.

Soviet covert and propaganda operations play a crucial role in this campaign. The Soviet efforts range from the spread of mutual suspicion and mistrust between segments of the Afghan population to the running and manipulating of complete resistance organizations.

The essence of the Soviet acceptance of the artificiality and futility of the "Saur Revolution" is the realization that the Afghan population did not undergo the brief monumental event that can transform nationalities from

one status to another; namely, a revolution.

Thus, in the current not-yet-socialist state of the Afghan nationalities, they perceive and define their identity in accordance with similar expressions of everyday life; namely, religion, language and cultural behavior.

According to the Soviet definition, the nationalities of northern Afghanistan have more in common with their brethren north of the Amu-Daraya than with these south of the Hindu-Kush. The Soviets emphasize that the boundaries of ethnic territories correspond to the social and economic history. Consequently, they believe that long-range stability will be achieved only in the wake of a regional solution.

The Soviet long-term strategy should not be confused with the ongoing military strategy which addresses specific challenges in Afghanistan. The Soviet military strategy helps to facilitate the eventual attainment of the long-term strategy. The Soviet long-term solutions are regional and, thus, include the dismemberment or destruction of Pakistan.

The current Soviet approach to the means adn methods with which to deal with the Afghan resistance is identical to the classic solutions of the Central Asian problems of the last 150 years. It is the realization of the futility of socialist solutions, the contronting of the Afghan realities, and the willingness to adopt and pursue not only the clasic

Russian adn Soviet goals and aspirations, but also the clasic Russian and Soviet socio-military solutions, that makes the Soviets so devastatingly effective against the Afghan resistance.

In 1985 the Soviet Union is closer than ever before to a total victory in the great game.

On the basis of the cumulative Russian and Soviet experience, the Soviets define the following military preconditions as the key to success in fighting against and the suppression of the Muslim insurgency:

(1) deep intelligence penetration and manipulation of the hostile population.

(2) deep raiding capabilities and the ability to conduct surgical strikes against priority objectives.

(3) the ability to rapidly inflict massive collateral damage to the civilian infrastructure in order to errode the popular support.

The Russian and Soviet conduct of military operations in Central Asia since the emergence of the modern Russian and Soviet armed forces at teh end of the 18th century, in which the validity ot these preconditions has been repeatedly demonstrated and proven, can be divided into three major

periods:

(1) the formulation of the operational art (1780s-1916).

(2) the integration of the techno-tactical aspects of mechanization into the operational art (1917-1945).

(3) the introduction of flexible and automated troop control and autonomous small unit combat operations into the operational art and tactics (1980).

The Russian and Soviet military approach to the conduct of counter insurgency combat operations called for three key elements: the operational flexibility and autonomy of the small unit, the availability of superior and flexible fire power (including the use of chemical weapons), and a complete intelligence picture.

The moment the Soviets succeeded in integrating these three key elements, the resistance started to suffer serious defeats. The goal in the conduct of special operations is to put the subversive organization constantly on the defensive through a series of devastating surprise strikes on its very deep sanctuaries.

In accordance with their traditional strategy, Soviet forces in Afghanistan do not attempt to pacify the areas in which they encounter resistance. When a village is known to be actively cooperating with the resistance, or that there is an active resistance group among the population, the Soviets

use special forces or the KDB (Punitive Desant Battalion) to destroy the entire village in order not to give away intelligence assets and in order to demonstrate to the resistance that the Soviet special forces can get them everywhere and by surprise.

The Soviets have made special efforts to penetrate the most conservative, traditionalist sectors of the populations. They seem to have an accurate picture of the situation of the resistance at any given moment. The Soviets also rely on their excellent intelligence penetration fo the resistance to conduct deep raids into sanctuaries of the resistance. These raids are usually conducted in order to seize newly-arrived weapons and supplies before they are disseminated to resistance forces and in order to capture or assassinate effective resistance commanders.

The most significant special operations are these conducted by SPETSNAZ 3-man teams in the deep rear of the enemy. There are also quite a few cases when a resistance commander, who was a KhAD agent, led his entire force knowingly into a devastatingly effective Soviet-DRA ambush and then joined the DRA forces.

History shows that the turning point in the Russian and Soviet struggle for the control of Muslim territories has been when they succeeded to effectively isolate the population and sever the external support to the local

resistance. The cumulative effect of the Soviet special operations has brought the population to a breaking point and total collapse while the manner in which the Western assistance is disseminated amounts to the virtual isolation of the Afghan resistance.

Taken together, these two trends constitute the key to the Soviet success. If the current trend continues, Afghanistan can be written off by the West, probably within months, and the Soviets will be encouraged to cntinue their persistent advance towards the warm waters and the Near East.

The Soviet Union is currently winning in Afghanistan. It has virtually crushed the resistance militarily and is on its way to attaining total victory. This will happen in teh very near future providing the U.S. assistance does not become more effective.

The Afghan resistance has already demonstrated its commitment to its struggle by continuing to fight while enduring the Soviet attrocities. The Soviets have been effectively employing the proven Russian strategies. Effective assistance to the resistance will prevent its isolation, thus denying the Soviets total victory.

The escalation of the struggle in Afghanistan is bound to have long-term influence on the Soviet empire. Although the decision to pursue regional rather than national solutions led Soviets to be more pragmatic and effective, it

has also exposed the Soviet Muslim population to outside influence and subversion because northern Afghanistan is now closer to the U.S.S.R. Central Asians have learned that a socialist revolution can be reversed. Afghanistan will not be lost if the U.S. assistance becomes effective, and soon.

Thank you.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you.

(The statement follows:)

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Alexiev?

Mr. Alexiev. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Soviet strategy for winning the war in Afghanistan, now in its sixth year, has, in my opinion, become increasingly obvious. It is a comprehensive strategy designed to subdue the Afghan people at the lowest possible military, political and economic cost to the Soviets.

The military dimension of this strategy has aimed primarily to intimidate and terrorize the population in resistance-controlled areas into withdrawing support from the Mujahideen or leaving the area. It has not sought a purely solely military defeat of the resistance probably because the Soviets realize that such an attempt would entail massive costs and no certainty of success.

The Soviet military investment, therefore, at some two to three percent of the overall military manpower, and military expenditures and about 10,000 killed has remained both limited and tolerable.

As part of its overall strategy, Moscow has placed a much greater emphasize, in my opinion, on economic and political warfare, on the correct assumption that defeating the resistance in these two areas would also bring about its military collapse.

Economically, the Soviets have pursued the destruction of the economic base of support for the Mujahideen among

primarily the rural population by deliberately disrupting food production and economic life in the countryside in general. In this they have been much more successful than in the purely military efforts, and the economic problem presently looms as the single most serious threat to the resistance in the short to medium term.

In the political realm, Soviet efforts have focused on winning over, bribing and coopting various tribal chieftans and Muslim dignitaries and building a loyal cadre with a vested political and economic interest in the regime's survival.

The number one objective here is to isolate the resistance politically and gradually transform the conflict into a civil war between forces loyal to the regime and the Mujahideen -- as in Central Asia, by the way, I should add.

Overall, despite the fact that Freedom Fighters continue to demonstrate high morale and indomitable courage as well as improved military effectiveness, the Soviet position in Afghanistan in my view has improved considerably in the past three years, the resistance has been forced on the defensive, and its long-term prospects are bleak unless these negative trends are reversed.

Before discussing the ways in which these trends could be reversed, and the role that the West could play in that, it is perhaps useful to address the question of the

implications of a Soviet victory in Afghanistan, some of which we heard in the explanation of the strategic maps.

There is, in my opinion, no clear evidence that Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan was part of a specific blueprint of expansionism in Southwest Asia, as as has been argued it is, and it is much more likely that the overriding objective was to prevent the overthrow of the communist regime by force, which would have set a very bad precedent from Moscow's point of view.

Nonetheless, it is clear that the consolidation of Soviet control in Afghanistan will improve the Soviet strategic position in Southwest Asia and open a number of very tempting opportunities for expanding Soviet influence in this key strategic region.

Pakistan, which historically has been beset by regional and separatist strife, would be most directly threatened. The Soviet Union already has a considerable record of subversive involvement in Pakistani separatist movements, also in Baluchistan, and some of the Pushtunistan areas. It is not likely to resist the temptation to destabilize a key western alley.

With a hostile communist Afghan regime, the Soviet army on its borders, and perhaps up to four million, possibly, "palestinized" Afghan refugees, Pakistan, will find itself in a more serious security predicament if and when the Soviets

strengthen their grip on Afghanistan.

The incorporation of Afghanistan in the Soviet Bloc would also present Moscow with opportunities in Iran, which is certain to experience serious political upheavals in the next few years. It should be recalled, as was already demonstrated, that Balouch territory extends through much of Southeastern Iran all the way to the Strait of Hormuz. And also there are other nationalities, such as the Tudeh in the north and Pushtune refugees, which the Soviets could conceivably use in their effort to destabilize Iran in the future.

Already there is considerable evidence that the Soviets are training and preparing Balouch separatists and Iranian Tudeh members, the communist party of Iran, and Pakistani left-wing oppositionists in Herat and Kabul for future contingencies.

Apart from these political opportunities there are a number of military power projection advantages that accrue to the Soviets in Afghanistan. Some of them were already mentioned. Soviet interdiction capabilities in the Persian Gulf are dramatically enhanced by their ability to operate out of airfields in Afghanistan.

For example, the distance between Southwestern Afghanistan and the Strait of Hormuz is less than 300 miles, which is easily within operating range of most Soviet

aircraft.

Also, in the Indian Ocean, besides the examples that were given, it should be mentioned that backfire bombers operating out of Afghanistan could reach the key U.S. base at Diego Garcia without refueling, which they were not able to do before. So transport airplanes could reach points in Eastern Africa, such as Ethiopia, again without refueling, which in my opinion considerably increases their strategic advantage.

Further, Soviet control of the Wakhan Corridor puts them within easy interdiction range of the Karakorum Highway, which is the only Chinese outlet to the Indian Ocean. A Sovietized Afghanistan, in short, could be and very likely would be transformed from an historical buffer zone to a stepping stone for further Soviet stabilization and expansion in a region that is vital and will remain vital to Western security interests.

Although these trends observed in the struggle for Afghanistan in my opinion are not particularly encouraging for the resistance at present, it is by no means a foregone conclusion the Soviets will be victorious. One of the main reasons for the difficulties experienced by the Mujahideen at the present is the fact in my opinion the aid effort mounted by Western countries and others to date does not appear to be very effective. Five years after the Soviet invasion, the

resistance has still not been provided with adequate quantities of effective weapons. There has been no systematic effort to provide economic assistance within the country, and the political dimension of the country, which is very important, has been neglected.

There are a number of reasons that may explain this failure. Perhaps most important, even though not the most obvious one, is the seeming lack of clear objectives to be achieved, clear Western objectives, and objectives of those that support it, objectives to be achieved through the provision of Western aid.

Despite considerable rhetoric decrying Soviet behavior, the prevailing attitude in the West seems to be one of resigned belief in the inevitable defeat of the resistance and unwillingness to test the validity of this proposition by providing the Mujahideen with the means to dramatically raise the cost of the war to the Soviets.

Such unwillingness is usually justified by arguments that a more effective aid program may trigger an escalation of Soviet military operations in Afghanistan or endanger Pakistan.

Both of these concerns, in my opinion, are based on flawed premises. There is no reason to believe, for example, that the Soviets are willing or even able to escalate the involvement in Afghanistan to the point where they can expect

a quick military solution. Given the terrain of the country and the dedication and commitment of the resistance, even half a million Soviet soldiers cannot guarantee Moscow the desired military and political outcome in the short term. If it did, they would not have hesitated deploying such numbers as they did, for example, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, where they did deploy half a million men.

On the other hand, for the Afghan people, of whom close to a million have been killed and more than four million, as has been mentioned, forced to flee the country, escalation is not really a meaningful concept. Short of open genocide, it cannot get much worse. As far as Pakistan is concerned, as long as the Afghan struggle continues, the Soviet Union is not in a position to mount a real military threat to it. Thus, in a very real sense the Afghan resistance does act as Pakistan's forward defense. And a good case could be made if it becomes stronger, it can only enhance Islamabad's security.

Therefore, there are some very good reasons for a concerted Western effort, which must be led by the United States, to provide the Afghans with the means needed not only to fight and die but to give them a chance to advance their cause. The resistance has a tremendous unrealized potential and the motivation necessary to mount a real challenge to the Soviets. We do not know if the Soviets will ever be willing

to reach an accommodation and leave the country, but the point I would like to raise here is we will never find out whether that is the case unless we make it possible for the Mujahideen to make Moscow pay a very steep price for its aggression.

Above and beyond the moral imperative of helping a small people subject to aggression by a great power, there is a very strategic imperative to do so. For the Afghan struggle, without question, is also the West's struggle.

To begin with, a good case could be made that by tying down the Soviets in a military conflict, however limited, the Afghans have placed some restraints on Soviet behavior elsewhere. The relative Soviet retrenchment in the Third World, of which Ambassador Kirkpatrick spoke, that has become noticeable in the past four or five years is at least in part due to Afghanistan since Moscow has been historically reluctant to become engaged in several conflicts at the same time.

Western ability to assist the Mujahideen in putting up a stiffer and more effective resistance, even if ultimately unsuccessful, would have served a purpose of demonstrating a determination to stand up to Soviet expansionism and is very likely to be taken into serious consideration in future Soviet decisions on intervention in other places.

Conversely, failure to do so could only encourage Soviet

perceptions that the West is reluctant and incapable of resisting even the most blatant encroachments. Western unwillingness to provide the Afghans with modern anti-air weapons under the pretext of plausible deniability, for example, is in all probability interpreted by Soviet generals not as a sensible policy of avoiding confrontation but as a sign of weakness.

It should be noted here that efficient Western aid could also be extremely cost effective. The principles of guerrilla war dictate that every dollar of effective aid to the guerrilla could cost up to 10 times as much to the opposing side to counteract. That is $10 the Soviets may otherwise be spending on weapons threatening us directly.

Finally, a successful resistance and Soviet failure to pacify Afghanistan by military means may force in the long term the Soviet leadership to start questioning the traditional Soviet belief in the unlimited political utility of military power -- a belief which is both a cornerstone of their political value system and a key determinant of Soviet international behavior.

Should the Soviets be made to realize that they cannot achieve the Sovietization of Afghanistan except at a prohibitive cost, it is not at all inconceivable that they may settle for much less than outright domination of Afghanistan. When asked why the Soviet Union failed to

Sovietize Finland after the winter war of 1939-1940, Stalin reportedly replied, "A hedgehog could be swallowed, but it is an extremely uncomfortable process."

It is not only our moral obligation but also in the best interests of the United States and the West to do everything possible to make Moscow's attempt to swallow Afghanistan also as uncomfortable as possible.

Thank you.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Mr. Alexiev.

There are some in the Administration who like to feel that things are going well in Arghanistan and that our policies have been effective and cite the statistic that the Freedom Fighters control only about 10 or 20 percent of the countryside and that the Soviets by implication control the rest.

Let me ask each of you do the Soviets control 80 percent of the countryside; and, if so, is that important? Let me ask you to keep your answers brief, if you can.

Dr. Gouttierre. I think that the most important factor to this is who is being put on the defensive. I think Yossef indicated that in his own presentation.

I think the most important thing here in terms of the resource, in terms of being able to control what some say is 80 percent of the country, is that they have essentially the run of the country in being able to carry on their activities

that are particularly focused in the rural areas.

But in the end result, the most important element to this whole righting will be the ability of the resistance to put the Soviets more on defensive in the areas which the Soviets have concentrated on controlling.

I agree with both Yossef and Alex that they need to have the appropriate technology to do that. We talk about appropriate technology in development schemes around the world. There is also an appropriate technology for supplying I think resistance forces.

The Afghans need appropriate technology in order to be able to put the Soviets on the defensive. The percentages I think are not all that important, although in some ways we have to recognize there is an advantage to the resistance to be able to have the run of the country in terms of their rural strategy.

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Bodansky, is it part of Soviet strategy to try to control the entire countryside?

Mr. Bodansky. No.

Senator Humphrey. Let me follow up on that. Then I will give you free run. The answer is no, it is not part of their strategy.

Mr. Bodansky. In the time frame we are talking about.

Senator Humphrey. So the assumption that the Soviets have been able to occupy, maybe that is a better word, only

20 percent is a sign they are bogged down is false, in your opinion.

Mr. Bodansky. Certainly false.

Senator Humphrey. Certainly false in my opinion. I shouldn't try to put words in your mouth, but too many in this country are assuming because the Soviets haven't occupied 100 percent of the entire country, they haven't tried to occupy 100 percent of the country.

Mr. Bodansky. They will not try.

Senator Humphrey. So they haven't failed in that sense.

Mr. Bodansky. No. I think they have succeeded exceptionally well.

Senator Humphrey. If their strategy then is not to occupy 100 percent of the country but instead strategic facilities and locations, then what is their strategy?

Mr. Bodansky. To my mind, the strategy is to establish, to control bases from which they can advance further should the need arise. The Soviet military operates in accordance with specific requirements of the government. So the government tells them consolidate the capabilities to do so if and when the party decides they should advance rather than to prevent a resistance from challenging or endangering their ability to operate these bases. These are the two requirements from the Soviet Union.

Let's look at historic precedence. If we look at the

Bashmajir Rebellion, Soviets are distinguished in 1922 when they succeeded to suppress leadership of the Bashmajir with the continuation of large-scale fighting to 1923. The Soviets say by 1922, although fighting continued, they had the country. The officers of that area started at that period to concentrate on the subversion of the entire region, looking at Central Asia, their own Central Asia, as an internal problem that will be solved eventually. I think the approach the Soviets take to Afghanistan is identical.

Senator Humphrey. Dr. Alexiev, your thoughts on that. If the Soviet strategy is not to occupy the entire country, what is the strategy?

Mr. Alexiev. That is certainly not their strategy. Let me add here a lot of Afghanistan is not occupiable because it is desert or otherwise uninhabited.

Another good example that the Soviets are not indeed trying to occupy the country physically is the fact they have left large parts of the country essentially alone. The central area of Afghanistan has been left alone because the Soviets believe that once they take care of other strategic areas, they will have no problem subduing these areas that they do not now pay attention to.

So their strategy essentially is to win the war economically and politically, and as long as they control the vital centers of the country, they control the major

logistics routes and transportation routes, that the military pacification of the country after economic and political success has been achieved will now be very difficult.

Again, to give not only the Bachow Rebellion as an example, but to give the examples of the rebellions in Lithuania after the war and also the anti-Soviet war in the northern Caucasian area. The same thing essentially happened, where the Soviets did not try to occupy all the resistance areas but concentrated instead on breaking up resistance politically and economically.

In fact, if you look at the example of Lithuania, when the anti-Soviet guerrillas finally laid down arms, they still controlled perhaps half of the country. They had anywhere between 15,000 and 20,000 men under arms. But they were defeated economically. They didn't have anything to eat. They didn't have any ammunition. So they surrendered.

Senator Humphrey. So the Soviet strategy is not to go for a knockout punch in the military sense.

Mr. Alexiev. No.

Senator Humphrey. But to control the important resources and to destroy, through political and economic means, the ability of the resistance to continue. Is that correct?

Mr. Alexiev. That is my view of it.

Senator Humphrey. Those terms, economic and political

warfare, hardly seem adequate to what is going on. Can you translate those terms, economic and political warfare, into the reality that is occurring as an integral part of the Soviet strategy, talking about the starvation, the terror, and so on?

Mr. Alexiev. To the Soviets, historically, economic warfare has included famine as a weapon, or starvation, if you will. And political warfare has included also assassinations and terror. But to them that is very political. So we shouldn't discuss them in the Western connotation of these words but, rather, in the way the Soviets perceive them.

I am sure that in the previous hearings the economic dimension of the Soviet efforts became very clear. What it is is essentially an effort to starve the Mujahideen out, destroying the economic base of their support. I don't need to go into details.

Let me just say that even Afghan official sources now admit that the crop has gone down to somewhere around 25 percent of where it was in '78. Already in some parts of the country it is very serious, at least the threat of a famine.

About a month ago, in Paris, the French experts on Afghanistan, who perhaps are the most knowledgeable in the West, had a meeting along with all the various doctors organizations, physicians organizations, that help inside of

Afghanistan, and their collective belief is at least half a million people in Afghanistan are threatened with famine immediately now. As the winter goes on, it will probably get much worse.

Another indication of the dimension of the problem is that even though the routes that lead to Pakistan which the refugees use are covered with deep snows at this time of the year, anywhere from two to four meters of now, according to the Pakistani Commission on Refugees, at least 10,000 refugees every month are coming over, even during the winter, which is an indication of the very serious problem.

Senator Humphrey. I want to pursue that further with you, but I think I should give Congressman Ritter a fair opportunity to do the same.

Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was interested in the testimony, Dr. Bodansky, and I will quote what you said: The Soviets are running and manipulating complete resistance organizations. Could you please expand on that?

Mr. Bodansky. Sure. Of the variety of examples, I think the most important are the Soviet activities with the Shiite population. There are about a dozen organizations of various sizes that are being financed and that are being equipped either by the Iranian government with Soviet equipment or directly by the Soviets.

Mr. Ritter. Are you saying the Iranian government is cooperating with pro-Soviet resistance groups?

Mr. Bodansky. To the best of my knowledge, yes, sir. I can give you an example. One of the resistance leaders near Herat was invited by the Iranian government to receive new equipment. He took with him a major of the logistics services of the Afghan armed forces that defected recently. According to the testimony of that major, the equipment that was offered to them, machine guns, any other weapons systems, was brand new and was packed and labeled exactly the same way that the equipment that his previous unit in the DRA used to receive from the Soviet Union. He said there is no difference. The weapons arrived from the Soviet Union, with the full knowledge of the government.

There are many other examples of that kind. But just sort of to cut it short, the most successful instrument the Soviets have today in dealing with resistance forces, in cutting the lines of communication, in ambushing commanders and assassinating commanders, is deep penetration and bringing the commander to the wrong place, or any other force to be killed or destroyed, bringing them into a killing zone.

Mr. Ritter. Are you saying not direct confrontation but the intelligence function, the KGB functions and disinformation is more debilitating to the Afghan Freedom Fighters today than the direct confrontation with the Soviet

forces?

Mr. Bodansky. It ends up with direct confrontation. You have special forces coming in and killing or you have a helicopter coming down and bombing.

Mr. Ritter. Why is this information that you are presenting to us simply not reported in our everyday media, these kinds of infiltrations of a dozen or so groups, the cooperation with the Iranian government, the Shiite, certain segments of the Shiite population supporting active resistance groups?

Mr. Bodansky. Personally I don't have any control on the western media. But the material is available. The material is pouring out in unbelievable quantity. That campaign of penetration, manipulation, sort of self-destruction of the resistance, is pouring out in growing quantities and in alarming frequency.

The successes of the Soviets in assassinating key commanders over the last few months is frightening, the Soviets not only assassinating commanders because they have data on them, but it is a country-wide or province-wide predetermined campaign. They know when to kill them. They kill them in the right moment, not just because they are available; the ability of resistance to coordinate forces by assassinating all the midlevel commanders in one province, then go for a sweep and collect the pieces. They do it all

the time. It has intensified as of '83 and '84, the moment they decided okay, we are going to play in the Muslim way, as they call it, concentrate and get the resistance to work for us, exactly like the Russian army killed the lieutenant of Shamel and brought about the collapse of the Caucasian Rebellion and the uprising in the 1750s. The same with the Apmabarchan in the 1820s. It has happened before.

Mr. Ritter. Could I ask a question then? If this penetration and manipulation is becoming so intensified and so successful, then even if the free world or the world supporting the Afghan Freedom Fighters increased its level of military support and technology, appropriate technology, we would conceivably be donating to the wrong people and the internal mechanisms might be so weakened that the materials could be used against the Freedom Fighters cause. Is that possible?

Mr. Bodansky. That is possible if Western aid arrives very late. But if we look at the current situation of Afghanistan, assuming the change might come in the near future, we have to look at the key to our understanding the future of this process, of this trend, is their profiles of the individuals as the finger pointers. These are dedicated resistance fighters who are totally disillusioned, totally disappointed, that lost any hope and faith in the cause of the resistance and are trying to buy a better future for the

families through act of changing their own personal code.

This is a personal collapse of the individual. If the current commanders see that there is hope they are winning, they are beginning to win, that aid is pouring in, and that they are not isolated and cut off from the rest of the world --

Mr. Ritter. How much time do we have?

Mr. Bodansky. Months, to my mind.

Mr. Ritter. Months?

Mr. Bodansky. Months.

Mr. Ritter. Mr. Alexiev?

Mr. Alexiev. I am much more optimistic than Yossef is. I don't think it is a question of months. I think fighting will be going on in Afghanistan for years to come.

Mr. Ritter. But I mean before we get to the point of no return and with the extrapolation no matter what gets thrown in, it still comes out in a downward direction, maybe not as steep, what is your time?

Mr. Alexiev. I can't put a number of months or years on it, but I believe that it is a lot. It is going to be much longer than months. I think it will take probably years.

Mr. Ritter. Dr. Gouttierre, you are familiar with the social and traditional institutions of the country. How long will it take?

Dr. Gouttierre. I am more sanguine than is Yossef as well, I think primarily because of those positive factors

that I was enunciating during my presentation.

I think that the kind of thing which Yossef has described is something which is not, as he would indicate, brand new, and these kinds of attempt have been going on throughout the five years. The fact that there has been an increasing number of commanders killed in battle as well as through assassination over the last five months is alarming to me, but I don't think that this is an indication that there is a wholesale loss in this area.

One of the things I think we need to remember, too, is the Afghan intelligence itself, resistance intelligence itself, has not been ineffective throughout the last five years. It has increased in certain, I think, capabilities.

The Soviets have reacted to this and have sought to preclude the Afghan puppet regime from any real role that might provide information to the resistance. But at the same time, the Afghans are reacting to this and finding new ways.

It is amazing the kind of specific information that comes out relating to what is going on inside Afghanistan of a very personal nature to individuals and their Afghan regime and also Soviets as well as certain elements of Soviet strategy.

So in concluding, I would say I am more sanguine that Yossef is. I am not going to say we have months or even a year or two. Again, let me go back to the phrase I used

earlier, that if we use appropriate technology, and we are talking about military, we are talking about humanitarian assistance in the areas of food, education and medicine, that the Afghans -- I used to coach basketball in Afghanistan for a long time. I coached the national basketball team. It gave me sort of an insight into the Afghan desire as Alex was suggesting.

They like to play with a winner. They have a real capacity for perceiving the way the trend may be going, whether it be in sports or whatever the case may be. They are very clever in their perceptions this way.

Mr. Ritter. What is your thought about the time that we have? I mean several years ago involving these questions it seemed we were really talking many years. But recently the intensity of the situation has increased and it seems we have gone much more negatively for the Freedom Fighters.

Dr. Gouttierre. I think in some aspects that is true. But we also have to remember that five years for a resistance movement under many circumstances would indicate that is a young resistance movement.

Mr. Ritter. But Dr. Alexiev has said that the isolation of I guess it was Caucasian or Central Asian group --

Dr. Gouttierre. But the Afghans haven't been isolated in the same fashion yet. In other words, the situation in Central Asia and the Caucasian areas was not exactly the same

as to the way the resistance was able to receive external aid.

I think the question on that is the appropriateness of it and efficiency. I think that today there is a better military situation than there was even a year ago at this time in terms of the way the Afghans are being trained and getting assistance. I am not painting a rosy picture in saying that. I am just saying that I think the response that perhaps public hearings like this and just the examination of things, the sophistication of the Afghans and their ability to handle these pieces of equipment and development of strategy, it takes time to develop these things. I think that these are developing them.

I think the point that is important is the Afghans are not in a position right now of what I would call a decline. I think we are at a very, very fragile and crucial period and that the effectiveness of our involvement is going to be even more crucial. But I think that at least to me it has been demonstrated that there is knowledge about what is necessary to be done and that the training and the equipment considerations are improving. But I am not saying that they are at the point where they need to be.

Mr. Ritter. Dr. Bodansky, are you in agreement with that?

Mr. Bodansky. No, sir, because it seems me that the

major problem --

Mr. Ritter. What did you say?

Mr. Bodansky. I said no, sir. The major problem the resistance is facing today, it is not just the mere assassinations but assassinations of commanders in combat, and as has been said before, it has happened before. But the resistance was always able to replenish and infiltrate new commanders to take over in their continuity of a party or a commander to run a bunch of people in that location, despite harassment, despite the sacrifices and victims. They cannot do it today.

Just to give you two examples that came to my mind. Sabula, one of the best commanders in the area, has been assassinated. This happens no other way but by betrayal.

Mr. Ritter. Is this Soviet special forces?

Mr. Bodansky. Yes. A mine and side charge had been organized in such a way when he entered into a secret path, that he decided upon only the night before because he recorded it, it exploded and he was killed. The same method was used for another commander in Muristat who was killed on January 28th of this year with an entire village destroyed on the same day so as not to leave any marks. After he left his 800 resistance force. Again, this was something that was decided minutes before. And the Soviets jumped and killed him. In both cases the resistance was unable to infiltrate

new commanders to take over.

We see a crumbling of the resistance forces that was otherwise functioning. In Mosra Sharif, there are no leaders or nobody to tell them what to do. That is what frightens me. The Soviets can exploit success and bring about the erosion. That is something that happened.

This is something that is mounting in the sophistication of this effort and, if continued, will to my mind bring about the collapse of the resistance either before the '85-'86 winter or after the '85-'86 winter because they cannot withstand it.

Mr. Ritter Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you.

I want to explore further the Soviet strategy. If the Soviets have not gone for the knockout punch, and obviously they haven't, instead opting for a long-range strategy, holding key centers, and practicing genocide against the people as a means of destroying resistance, if the Soviets have not gone for the knockout punch, the question is why have they not? Why haven't they tried to occupy a hundred percent of the country? Why haven't they tried to destroy in a short period of time the entire Afghan resistance?

Dr. Alexiev, is there a reason they haven't done that? If they could get a quick victory, they would go for one, surely.

Mr. Alexiev. That is right. But they cannot.

Senator Humphrey. Why have they not?

Mr. Alexiev. In my opinion, in order to control the country, to control Afghanistan, they would have to inject the kind of resources that perhaps they are not capable of. I mean we very often assume that the Soviets have unlimited resources, both military and economic. That is simply not the case. I don't believe the Soviet Union can put in half a million men.

Senator Humphrey. They presently have about 115,000 or 120,000.

Mr. Alexiev. That is roughly the estimate, although there are some people who argue it is actually a lot less than that.

Senator Humphre. In any case, are you suggesting it would take an increase of manpower on the order of a factor of five?

Mr. Alexiev. I am not sure that would do it either.

Senator Humphrey. Even that would not assure that.

Mr. Alexiev. That is right. The nature of the terrain in Afghanistan is such that actually physical occupation of the country is almost unthinkable. This a country the size of Texas that is essentially vertical. It is not a feasible proposition. Even if it were, for the Soviets, the economic consideration, the cost involved to do such a thing, apart

from the political cost, the military cost, I imagine, for example, that a force of that nature would require maybe five to six times, maybe up to ten times the helicopter force they have there now. That would mean to weakening Soviet positions in other places of the world.

It is very clear, I don't think they can afford it. So people that argue that we should not try to raise up the ante because anything we can do, the Soviets can do us one better, I think really are not correct in that assessment. I think the Soviet capabilities of projecting power are finite. If they could, if they thought they could achieve their objectives in a quick way, I am sure they would do it. But there is no certainty on their part that even, as I said, half a million men would achieve the purpose. And being bogged down with half a million men is something they would not want to have.

On the other hand, as I have indicated and I believe the present strategy is working for them, it is a long-term strategy. They are not going to solve the problem tomorrow, the day after tomorrow. But they don't need to.

By that I mean the Soviets are not thinking in terms of defeating the resistance tomorrow. What they are thinking of is making the Afghan resistance a nuisance rather than a serious problem. Even if they achieve their major objectives, I am convinced that fighting will continue to go

on in Afghanistan for years to come.

But as I think Yossef mentioned, in Central Asia, the Bashiv movement was essentially crushed by 1926 militarily; yet fighting continued until at least the mid-thirties. And the same thing, I am afraid, is what the Soviets are attempting to do in Afghanistan.

Senator Humphrey. Dr. Gouttierre, do you agree the Soviets have not gone for the knockout punch, the quick victory, because it would take a much larger commitment of troops?

Dr. Gouttierre. I think that is obvious.

Senator Humphrey. It isn't obvious to everybody, believe me.

Dr. Gouttierre. It is going to take obviously more troops than have been employed so far.

Senator Humphrey. By what factor would they have to increase that commitment?

Dr. Gouttierre. I am not a specialist in that area. We keep hearing that it would be by a factor of five or around half a million troops. That is the magic number you keep hearing. I don't know how many it would require.

But I think we also have to understand that one of the reasons why they haven't gone in for the knockout punch is they haven't been able to deliver the knockout punch to date. I think that is a very important consideration.

I share Yossef's concern and also Alex's of the Soviet ability to maybe deliver this knockout punch sometime in the near future, if particular negative factors having an impact on the Afghans' ability to resist the control of the Soviets persist. But I think that also there is to me a solid foundation with which the Afghans are able to deal, that should they get again the appropriate technology across the broad spectrum, that this particular kind of scenario -- I think both of these gentlemen have indicated that as well -- is one that might be avoided.

I tend to feel that the situation right now is a little more sanguine on the side of the Afghans because of the factors that I feel don't necessarily pertain to the Afghans, that may have pertained to other areas, and that are maybe caused by my long-term association with the Afghans. I have a lot of regard for their tenacity and the strengths of their institutions.

But I can't tell you exactly how many troops are required. I don't think the Soviets have been up to this point able to deliver that knockout punch. I think the Afghans have surprised many people around the world with their ability to sustain this resistance.

Senator Humphrey. Supposing they did try to increase their troop commitments to say half a million, Mr. Bodansky. How would they do it? They don't have those kinds of forces

readily available, do they? Where would they get them?

Mr. Bodansky. No, they don't have the troops readily available, and I don't see them being able to sustain them in Afghanistan. There is not enough military structure in Afghanistan that they can house that many troops. There is no point.

If we look at the Soviet deployment in Afghanistan, if I can go into a little bit more detail, the Soviets to my mind entered in 1979 with an idea of somehow supporting the local armed forces and getting the hell out of there as fast as it could. The major decisionmaking on Afghanistan was the spring of 1980 when they realized they were going to stay there and, therefore, decided that the bulk of their deployment in that country was going to be part projection oriented.

By the fall, early winter of 1980, the bulk of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, at that time about 16 percent of the Soviet forces in the country, were housed in garrisons outside the reach of the resistance. Since then, if we look at the Soviet reinforcement, there is a very interesting correlation. When the country subsides and comes down, then the Soviet reinforces that region. They do not reinforce before they go for the kill. They reinforce after they go for the kill. Most of the reinforcements go directly into bases surrounded by very wide belts of mines and other

obstacles, usually three to four kilometers wide. The troops are sitting there, not exposed to danger, and contributing nothing to the pacification.

There is limited ability of the Soviets to install troops in this basin. They are building a lot, but more air bases and forward deployment zones, forward basing zones, rather than garrisons where they can house troops.

Senator Humphrey. I think the key phrase there is limited ability. I agree with that. What I am trying to do in this line of questioning is to dissolve the image of the Soviets as having achieved a fait accompli. We imagine the Soviets have all the advantages and none of the vulnerabilities. That isn't so. It would take an enormously larger amount of troops to prevail militarily. That larger commitment would require them to withdraw troops from the border with China, from Eastern Europe, perhaps to resort to even greater conscription, which has its own domestic penalties. It would cost them enormously in economic terms to maintain and support. It would up the ante tremendously.

Why should they do it when they can do it on the cheap, as they are today, by holding a few key points and destroying the Afghan people?

Mr. Bodansky. If I may interrupt, I think that the major threat, potential threat, we have today with Afghanistan is not how many troops are going to be brought

into Afghanistan but the export of Muslim self-identity. The realization that their fate there in Central Asia is not doomed, that something might happen, is the greatest potential for solution of the Afghan problem, because on the one hand the Soviets will be denied the use of the Muslim population as a source of manpower, especially to the military and industry, and on the other hand that is a different league of problem and they will have to pour in millions of troops to control the area.

This is something that they cannot do objectively unless there is total mobilization, at whatever price this may have to the national economy. That is the potential for an escalation in Afghanistan.

Senator Humphrey. There are those who say that if the free world were to enable the Freedom Fighters to fight effectively against Soviet helicopters, for instance, that the provision of such aid would stimulate the Soviets to respond massively. We have been talking about the ability of the Soviets to respond massively.

How could they do it? How could they respond? If the assumption is correct that providing more effective weaponry to the Freedom Fighters would invite massive escalation by the Soviets, how could they possibly do it? Could things be any worse than they are today for the Freedom Fighters?

Mr. Bodansky. Yes. Because the greatest vulnerability

of the resistance is lack of organization, command structure, and normal functioning lines of communication. If we just throw a few missiles, regardless of the type, to a local commander, as dedicated as he may be, Soviet repression will be localized.

They have ample facets in Afghanistan to do it today. They won't like the escalation, but it won't be a disastrous setback. What is going to happen is there will be a collapse of the resistance infrastructure in that area.

If we look, for example, at an attempted kidnap of a lieutenant colonel in Banishavan, the commanders were wiped out, and so were those kidnaped. But about four to six thousand civilians were destroyed and the entire lines of communication were destroyed. That is something they could not recover from. So if we supply them the efficient weapons, teach them what to do, not only technically how to pull the trigger, but also the support system that can withstand the action and come back and maintain the pressure on the Soviets, then the Soviets do not have the reaction in Afghanistan today with forces capable of answering to this issue.

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Alexiev, what of this contention that if the free world were to provide the Freedom Fighters with more effective weapons, that it would stimulate massive Soviet escalation? What do you think of that contention?

Mr. Alexiev. I don't think very much of it. As I think I indicated in my testimony, we already discussed why they may not be able to escalate in terms of putting in more troops to the point where they may think that they could win. I also doubt very much whether they are actually capable of projecting technical military power of the kind that will subdue the resistance.

Perhaps I disagree somewhat with Yossef on the point of destroying Mujahideen organizational capabilities in the country. The fact is that five years after the war, they have not really been able to do that in any considerable extent anywhere, even in Panjhir, where they have now had eight offensives one after the other. Using the last time around, 500 tanks and God knows how many helicopters, and depopulating the area. They have not been able to destroy the resistance. Even the assassination attempts are not nearly as frightening as I think they may appear. Sabul is the first commander of rank and name that has been killed of the top ten commanders in Afghanistan, five years after the war. More, of course, have been hunted down by the Soviets. But it hasn't been terribly effective.

To answer your question, I just don't believe the Soviets have an infinite capacity for increasing. I think this is often an opinion in the West. It is a defeatist attitude because the implicit statement here is that "Look,

if they want to do whatever we can do, they can do it better, let's not even try doing it."

As applied to Afghanistan, it is a very pernicious attitude.

Senator Humphrey. Let's try to conclude by making some specific recommendations on what the free world should do to help the Freedom Fighters deals effectively with the strategy that is now becoming clear; namely, to eliminate the ability of the Freedom Fighters to continue by destroying the economy, destroying agriculture, destroying society, while continuing to hold onto key strategic points.

Dr. Gouttierre, do you have some specific proposals?

Dr. Gouttierre. Well, they are the same basic proposals that I had five years ago in a similar situation. That is that the most important elements are to ensure again that the Afghans have the appropriate technology. I think we must understand what this term means.

Senator Humphrey. What does that mean?

Dr. Gouttierre. I am glad you asked. It means not only the specific kind of weapons but also the right training and also providing them to the right people.

If one engages willy-nilly in the distribution of these things, you create a situation that will, of course, invite the kind of retaliation that will ensure the destruction of various forces around Afghanistan. I think that there has

been an increased development in terms of providing appropriate technology. I am not saying that it is there. I am just saying there has been development along those lines.

In addition to that, I think it is important that the public diplomacy --

Senator Humphrey. Wait a minute. Before you go on, you said more effective military supplies. What do you mean by that?

Dr. Gouttierre. I don't want to go into the specific military weapons. We can talk about armored piercing weaponry. We can talk about missiles and things of this nature. I am talking about in each situation in Afghanistan there is a commander or group of commando units around an area that might require a certain kind of weaponry. I think it is important that that kind of weaponry be directed to them.

I think we have to understand what it is they need. It is not all the same. There are some elements that are more effective in urban situations, others that are operating more against bases from a long-term advantage. They need certain kinds of things that would maybe put explosives into a particular area. It is not exactly the same kind of thing that an urban-based approach would require.

I am not a specialist on weaponry, but I think that when we are talking of those things, weapons, food, education and

medicine, that each particular area has local and regional needs. I think that this has been developing. It is not where it needs to be yet.

I think that continued interest on the part of individuals like yourself and Congressman Ritter will of course prompt this kind of more efficient delivery and training that goes along with the weapons themselves.

Now, if I may go to the public diplomacy, I think it is only within the last year really that the diplomatic aspect of this thing has received the kind of across-the-board interest that is essential. I am talking about bipartisan not only as it relates to party. I am also talking about bipartisan as it relates to the Administration and Congress.

I think the kind of interest that has been obtained over the last half year has greatly increased over the previous four and a half years. This is very important. I think we need to direct this more to the public forums. We need to direct this more to countries like India and to Western Europe, particularly also to the Islamic movement and other Third World countries.

I think this particular thing has been carried at a rather low key. The only way I think that there can be a resolution of the war in Afghanistan that would permit the Afghans to achieve their very basic objectives is to have increased military pressure, increased public diplomacy.

That entails a whole wide spectrum.

The media I have sort of given up on. I think that in terms of sending their own personnel into Afghanistan, they rely very heavily on stringers and very heavily on hearings and press conferences to develop their information. I wish the media would be more persistent and I think more honest, really, in their coverage of the war in Afghanistan. I think we find coverage of wars in Central America is easier to go to.

I heard one fellow from the UP told me the trouble with the Afghans is they don't call press conferences, the resistance; therefore, we can't really get much information from them. Well, where is the spirit of investigative journalism that is supposed to prevail in our media?

I think those two areas, improved and increased military pressure and improved and increased public diplomacy, are absolutely essential. The Soviets aren't paying in eith area the degree to which they need to. But I think, in conclusion, that if the Afghans -- and I think it has to be stressed again -- have the resources to make eventually successful the adaptation of these particular kinds of military and diplomatic pressures that way, they will ultimately achieve their objectives. I believe that because I know the commitment of the Afghan people. It is a war of national liberation now.

Senator Humphrey. Before you answer the question, Mr. Bodansky, will you introduce our final witness who is standing over here to your left and tell us about this fellow?

Mr. Bodansky. Okay. This is an example of the chemical decontamination suit. It is a brand new suit. The model is old, but the suit itself is brand new. It was captured in the northeastern part of Afghanistan, part of about a dozen that were sent in a truck that were sent with emergency supplies from regiments to a company.

Senator Humphrey. When was this captured?

Mr. Bodansky. '83.

Now, by Soviet definition, you do not send regiment level equipment such as a suit from the regimental storage area to the company or platoon level unless intending use. So the mere fact this dozen suits were on the way, and God knows if more were not there in the same truck, is an indication that somebody higher up decided it is about time the troops will need these suits.

Senator Humphrey. Do you suppose the Soviet commanders were anticipating a chemical attack from the Freedom Fighters?

Mr. Bodansky. No. Here we go to another step. There are two ways or two forms of wearing this kind of suit. One of them is under attack, when suddenly there is

contamination, radiation or chemical, and you start from the mask hood and you go downwards. The other one is when you are in a safe area preparing for possibly going to a contaminated scene. Then you start from the boots and go upwards.

One of the questions I asked one of the troops here was how they were trained to use chemical suits. They are trained like all Soviet soldiers. All of them have been trained only on the secondary form of wearing it, wearing the suits in a safe area just prior to possible entry into contaminated areas.

Furthermore, all the service detectors, ranging from a new generation of chemical reconnaissance vehicle to manned portable detectors, have only the detectors for Soviet-made agents. There was no detector or warning or alarm system that might warn on western-made or any other agent not in use by the Soviet armed forces.

Adding to this is the fact the Soviets themselves have made a quite sizable deployment of chemical troops in Afghanistan, routinely disseminating in the operation of smoke screens. It is an indication of Soviet capabilities to use chemical weapons. Because on the delivery systems used and mentioned in the Soviet press as well as having been pictured in the West, they are identical for both uses as lethal agents.

We have Brigadeer Wyty, the chemical officer of the 99th artillery regiment, who defected in late 1984. He provided very detailed, very explicit testimony as to how the Soviet disseminate chemical weapons, location of soldiers and everything.

So we have all the conclusive evidence one can get as to the reports, the so-called unsubstantiated reports, of personnel, of Afghan refugees who come out and descrobe incidents in which they have been ostensibly subjected to chemical weapons. We shall not find other eye witnesses because in most cases they are dead.

What I do and have found to be highly successful is asking these individuals for details about the method of dissemination. These people never read the regulation book of the Soviet armed forces, and yet they come up with a very detailed description of things that they do not understand. They tell you oh, well, there was a vehicle, eight wheels or something like that, rather than identifying by kind. But when comparing these details with known Soviet procedures of delivery, you get very conclusive evidence these people know what they are talking about, which brings me to the conclusion that there is a massive use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and that it has been integrated fully into the small routine military operation, just like rifles, part of the game.

Senator Humphrey. You contend that the Soviets are using chemical weapons on a routine basis.

Mr. Bodansky. Yes. And it is just another instrument brought in should the need arise. If we look at the testimonies that are available, although the number of incidents had declined over the year, the percentage of combat operation in which the commander of the unit has the authority to use chemical weapons and in which chemical weapons have been introduced over the years has risen sharply. Today there are just merely far fewer regiment operations in Afghanistan, and in that case there are fewer cases in which chemical weapons can be brought into use.

But taking the percentages, the line is increasing. The sophisticated effectiveness of the use is increasing. The methods of dissemination are diversifying. I think that the experience the Soviets get from there is highly valuable for any further contingency, be it Central Europe or China.

Senator Humphrey. All right. Will you give us your recommendations?

Mr. Bodansky. I think if one generalizes, what we need to do is provide the Afghan resistance in the interior with an alternative to civilian administration that is capable of taking care of all the needs of the population, but in which it is in charge. This, of course, includes or is a primary goal of taking care of the security and safety of their

administration, which can be achieved through fighting against the other side.

We need to start to realize that support because the normal national liberation unit lives more on populace support than the availability of one weapons system or another.

The second thing is all of this should be done on a long-term, protracted basis; that aid and assistance and training should be pumped out and continued; that the individual know that there is a whole organization behind him.

If we do that, we can escalate. Just throwing in one weapons system or another will not help. I think it is possible. I think we are running out of time as far as this is concerned. So if we can do this, if we can look at the problem as a whole and answer all the requirements of the resistance, we break the isolation, which is a Soviet precondition for victory.

Senator Humphrey. What about in the area of public policy?

Mr. Bodansky. Myself, I write a little bit. I have a dismal record of getting the press to report the variety of items that became known to me. I think once somehow the public gets to know the severity of the problems, what is happening, there are some details and plenty of them,

pictures and et cetera, then there will be a need for this kind of information. But the media, for whatever its own reasons, have been very reluctant to get involved in it. That is not my expertise. I don't know anything about western media beyond some sort of disappointment.

Senator Humphrey. Do you have expertise in the area of international relations in the sense you would be aware of opportunities missed by the West, by the United States, to attack this from a public diplomacy angle?

Mr. Bodansky. I don't know. All I know is the data is available and a lot of things that, for example, can be explained to Europeans about the variety of European security using precedence or the tactical experience coming from Afghanistan have never been used. Nobody talks about the influx of Soviet officers and senior NCOs to the offices in Germany. We emphasize the common experience in Afghanistan and not only their ability to utilize and integrate their experience with prior experience but also to improve the overall performance of that unit. That, for example, is something that happens.

The same thing can be said about the north, the northern flag, Sweden and everywhere else. But nobody would listen. I don't know. The data is there. That is the only thing I can say. It is there and it can be used.

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Alexiev?

Mr. Alexiev. There are, of course, many things that could be done to counter the Soviet strategy which, as Yossef mentions, here it has all three dimensions: political, military and economic.

I think the West should have the strategy which addresses the problem in all of these measures.

To start with the political effort, the fact is that five years after the beginning of that war, the Afghans still do not have any international representation, if you will. It does not have to be a representation that is tied to any one group or faction, but something that simply represents the interests of the Afghan people without being political about it.

I don't see any reason why there shouldn't be some group of people or some forum that speaks for the Afghan interests and then be represented at the UN. The PLO has on observer status at the UN and even the notorious Soviet front organization, KGB, such as at the World Peace Council, have observers and at the UN. The Afghans, of course, do not. I think this is something the West could help with.

Senator Humphrey. How? How do you get the Afghans to unify even to the extent of just getting some kind of international recognition?

Mr. Alexiev. I don't think you have to get the Afghans unified in the sense that you get everybody in the various

parties to agree to become unified before you can do that. What you can do, I think, is find a group or a distinguished Afghan who is not partial to any political party and whose job would be simply to expound the interests of the Afghan people.

There are enough distinguished Afghans in this country, many of them with diplomatic experience, that could fill that slot. It seems to me if you make it clear to the groups in Bashawar these people will be essentially their public relations representatives and not get involved in the politics of the resistance, I don't see why there should be opposition to that.

Senator Humphrey. How could the United States recognize such a person or group while it maintains diplomatic relations with the Kabul government, as it does at present?

Mr. Alexiev. That is a question that I think the State Department should answer. But I am puzzled as many others, I am sure, because of the fact that we do grant diplomatic recognition to the regime in Kabul and by doing that we in effect legitimize this government to whatever extent.

The arguments that are usually given why we should do that, such as the need to collect intelligence, basically that is the only argument I have heard, does not hold much water in my opinion. If that were the case, why don't we have a diplomatic representation of Phnom Penh, for example,

or Luanda or Vietnam or other places?

I frankly do not understand why we continue to recognize the regime. I think it is a very important political obstacle to address the political dimension.

Senator Humphrey. That is quite true. As you heard Ambassador Kirkpatrick say earlier, one of the reasons that Mr. Gorbetsky got into a meeting with the President and Abdul Hauk did not is we recognize the Kabul government. What a perfect example of why that is such folly. Here we admit a man who could be accused of being a criminal or a monster, Mr. Gorbetsky, getting into the Oval Office, and a certified hero who has been wounded about 16 times can't get in because we recognize a public government of the Soviet Union. There is a perfect example of how it works in real life when we do something as foolish as legitimize a criminal puppet government such as exists in Kabul. (Applause)

Mr. Alexiev. I cannot agree with you more on this issue. Let me just add a footnote, that there are precedents where the United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of countries in the Soviet Union by force. The obvious example is the Baltic nations which were invaded by the Soviet Union, incorporated by the Soviet Union by force. To this day the United States does not recognize that annexation and in fact maintains diplomatic relations with representatives in exile of these countries.

So the precedent is there and it is not clear to me what the U.S. interest involved in this is; in other words, to maintain an embassy.

Let me just say a couple words about the economic dimension and the military dimension, to answer your question as to the what could be done. It seems to me that again, in my opinion, the economic problem is the more serious problem in the short term, in the medium term. If the Soviets succeed in denying the economic base of support to the Mujahideen, I think the military effort would collapse by itself.

I have talked myself to many people and anybody that has followed Afghanistan can tell you that there are many cases where the Afghans had to terminate military operations because of the fact they did not have anything to eat. Just recently I talked to one commander who had been beseiging a Soviet outpost and after two years of subsisting on boiled alfalfa, they had to give up.

Here it is important to provide assistance inside of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the way the international aid effort is structured now, it makes it almost attractive to the Afghan peasant to leave the country because if nothing else, they go to Pakistan, to the refugee camps, and at least they are assured some food and shelter.

In other words, a good case could be made that people

inevitably go where the money is. The money right now is in Pakistan. If we are able to provide them with economic assistance inside the country, I am sure many Afghans who live in rather wretched conditions in the refugee camps will go back and will resume cultivating the land. Because the problem with the disruption of agriculture is not only disruption by Soviet bombing and destruction of the irrigation systems, et cetera, burning the crops, which has been well documented, but the fact that the economic activities in the Afghanistan countryside are no longer profitably, no longer meaningful. If a given peasant could reckon with having to feed perhaps 50 Mujahideen every week or month and yet he does not have enough for himself, he may simply give up and move to Pakistan.

On the other hand, if we provide the Mujahideen and the people inside with the means they need to be able to buy their food, in my opinion this would inevitably result in an improvement of the agricultural situation. In the long term, that is a key factor for the viability of the effort. The resistance simply cannot fight without the people to support it. It is a key issue which is not only humanitarian but also has military strategic implications.

On the military realm, again, it seems to me that the problem has been that many weapons systems, above and beyond some of the things that Yossef was saying, simply have not

been given to the Afghans. As a result, they are not capable of raising the cost to the Soviets. Those systems should be provided to them, training should be provided. That is very, very important.

I don't think that the Afghans are as adept in using the weapons as they should be, primarily because very little training is provided to them. The weapons systems could again be much more effective for them.

To give you one example, most Soviet airfields in Afghanistan are surrounded by a mine defense perimeter which is usually anywhere between three and four kilometers. This is not totally by accident. The fact is the only long-range weapon the Afghans have to do damage to these airfields is the Soviet 82 millimeter mortar which gives a range of three kilometers. Yet there are mortars in the western arsenals which have ranges starting with 4.5 millimeters all the way up to six kilometers. A weapon like that could really dramatically improve their ability to fight.

Many of these areas are not defensible from such ranges. Also, the airfields could expand their perimeters to be beyond range of some of these weapons, again the anti-air weapons that I don't think have been particularly effective. They have been given, the Soviets, 12.7 machine guns and the 40.5 machine gun, and they are better weapons. It is a question of political will, not necessarily of lacking the

technology.

There are a number of other things that could be done, but these are just a couple of examples of what seems to me needs to be done if we were to allow the Afghans to raise the cost to the Soviets to where they may start having second thoughts.

Senator Humphrey. Yossef?

Mr. Bodansky. Even with the weapons systems that they have today, I think we can increase their effectiveness. For example, if you organize the team teaching them how to zero in the sightings of the 12.7 millimeter machine guns, they can hit far better than they do today. Give them better ammunition, simple things of that kind, and they can utilize weapons available to them much more effectively than they do. Again, I don't see any reason why such things should not be done or cannot be done within a very brief period.

Senator Humphrey. All right. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your expert testimony and your time and assistance.

The Task Force is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 2:00 p.m., the task force was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.)